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Napoleon's Failure to Conquer the Land of Israel: Principles of Maritime Strategy, Then and Now

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In 1798, General Napoleon Bonaparte disembarked at Abukir, near Alexandria, at the head of a large ground force of 37,000 men, having been taken there by a French naval force. Some ten months later, after a failed campaign of conquest, he performed a hasty and stealthy retreat back to France, leaving his army behind in Egypt. The invasion had taken place at the height of the French Revolution, a period of internal strife and regime change in France in 1789-1799.

This article seeks to examine how and why Napoleon failed and what insights and lessons may be drawn from his expedition for Israel's geostrategic position in the present day. The argument that we seek to advance is that the roots of Napoleon's failure lie in the (British) Royal Navy's activities against his forces: its destruction of the French landing fleet, its capture of the vessels that sought to reinforce and supply French forces as they advanced north along the coastline, and its assistance to the Ottoman forces besieged in Acre. In other words, the decisive factor behind the failure of Napoleon's land expedition in the Land of Israel was the Royal Navy's absolute sea control in the eastern Mediterranean and its intervention on the side of the Ottomans to thwart Napoleon's invasion.

First, we shall present several principles about the concept of sea control, after which we shall describe the historical background of Napoleon's expedition in the Land of Israel and his failure, and we shall discuss aspects of naval strategy. Later, we shall compare Israel's situation in the present day to Napoleon's situation back then, finding both similarities and differences. We conclude that like Napoleon's expedition in the Land of Israel, the modern State of Israel is similarly dependent on maritime supply lines and must therefore ensure its control of this maritime domain. We shall analyze the balance of power between Israel and its enemies in the northern maritime arena and present our understanding of the new required doctrine of sea control, and its limitations, in light of the lessons of history.

Sea control

The subject of sea control has been extensively studied over the years, including by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), Sir Julian Stafford Corbett (1854-1922), Admiral Raoul Castex (1878-1968), Admiral Wolfgang Wagner (1875-1956), and many others. Analysis of the elements of maritime control tends to focus on the balance of naval power, naval strategy, naval battles, and the integration of naval forces in land battles, in terms of amphibious

landings, naval sieges, and artillery support to assist and supplement land-based efforts. Several conventional terms are important for our discussion:

- **Sea power**: The ability of a state to extend its military power onto the seas to advance its needs and to deprive its enemies and rivals of capabilities. In his book *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, published in 1890, Mahan defines the elements of sea power as a fleet of warships, support vessels, a merchant fleet, naval bases, capable manpower, and today we would add, an air force ("Sea Power", *Encyclopedia Britannica*).

- **Command of the sea/Mastery of the sea/sea control**: The ability of a state, using its sea power, to use its maritime forces without interference and to deny the same to its enemies and rivals. Command of the sea is the highest achievable level of sea control (Corbett, 1911).

- **Maritime superiority**: The degree of dominance by one maritime power over another, allowing it to operate at a particular time and place, and in doing so, to prevent the interference of any opposing force (Corbett, 1911).

- **Littoral warfare**: The domain of warfare adjacent to a coastline; the definition of "adjacent", in terms of distance, is a matter of debate (Vego, 2015).

Julian Corbett, one of the preeminent maritime strategists, refers to sea control as "command of the sea", which he divides into two levels.[1] This distinction allows us to accurately describe the type of maritime control with which this article deals: we are discussing *local command*, in the context of the eastern Mediterranean.

> General command: "General command is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send Squadrons to sea." (Corbett, 1911)

> This contrasts with **local command**, which "implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent."

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1   Shaul Chorev, *Maritime Domain, Maritime Strategy, and Everything in Between* (Israel: Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center, University of Haifa, and Maarachot, 2021), p. 150, fn. 77 [Hebrew].

The historical and geostrategic background of Napoleon's campaign in Egypt and the Land of Israel

Great Britain and France fought for global domination and the expansion of their respective empires. In 1792, at the height of the French Revolution, coalitions coalesced in Europe to counter France's aggression and the danger that its revolutionary ideas posed to their monarchist regimes. In 1796, Napoleon Bonaparte, then a young general, was sent at the head of an invading force to northern Italy, where he achieved significant gains against the local kingdoms and the Austrian Empire, and he founded an independent republic based on the principles of the Revolution, under French protection. Upon his return to France, basking in victory and glory, the Directory, the executive branch of Revolutionary France, appointed him the commander of the Grand Armée, an innovative 200,000-strong military force based for the first time on mass conscription, assembled on the banks of the English Channel in preparation for an invasion of Great Britain.[2] After a string of maritime defeats, France realized that Great Britain enjoyed unequivocal sea control and understood that it was futile to try to invade the British Isles without sea control in the Channel and its surrounding seas. Its invasion plan was therefore abandoned, and Napoleon and his army were tasked with attacking Great Britain through an invasion of Egypt in order to sabotage British trade with its prized imperial possession, India (Gihon, 2003).

Napoleon's campaign and the reasons for its failure: a maritime strategy perspective

En route to Egypt, Napoleon conquered the island of Malta after a brief battle and negotiations with its chivalric orders. When his fleet reached Abukir, undetected by the Royal Navy, a 37,000-strong force began to disembark on May 1, 1798. After conquering Alexandria, Cairo, and the whole of Egypt, Napoleon continued north at the head of a force of 12,000 men along the coast of the Sinai through El-Arish, Gaza, Jaffa, and the interior of the Land of Israel, all the way to Acre, to which they laid siege. Coming after several successes, Napoleon's invasion was expected to produce a swift and successful conquest. His surprise landing on Egypt's shores had provided a positive start, as had his initial successes in land battles in Egypt and the Land of Israel. The French had triumphed over Mamluk and Ottoman forces thanks to their superior equipment and the advanced methods of warfare that they had brought from Europe. Napoleon's plan was

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[2]   In the context of these wars, mass conscription was used, which constituted an RMA (revolution in military affairs), and allowed European armies to conduct wars (or rather, dragged them into such wars) on massive scales that were not previously typical.

to conquer Acre (controlled at the time by its Ottoman ruler, Jazzar Pasha), seize control of its treasures and 300,000 people (including Druze, Maronite, and Bedouin — ethnic minorities who were waiting to see the results of the siege before deciding which side to back), conquer Damascus, and from there, to march on Constantinople (Gihon, ibid.).

The precise time at which Napoleon's campaign began to falter came on August 1, 1798, about a month after the landing at Abukir. That was when a naval force under the command of Horatio Nelson caught sight of the French landing fleet anchored at Abukir Bay and obliterated it. The Battle of Abukir fits Alfred Thayer Mahan's definition of a "decisive battle" (Mahan 1890): a battle in which the eventual victor is guaranteed sea control.

Indeed, the battle ended in the decisive victory of the Royal Navy, under Nelson's command. The Royal Navy, which comprised 14 battleships (13 with 74 cannons apiece, and one with 50 cannons), retained its full power, while the French fleet, comprising four frigates and 13 battleships (one with 120 cannons, three with 80 cannons apiece, and nine with 74 cannons), suffered the obliteration of three battleships and one frigate and the capture of nine more battleships. Of the French forces, 1,700 men were killed, 600 were wounded, and 3,000 were taken captive, compared with only 218 deaths and 677 injured men on the British side (Sas, 1991). By the end of the battle, the French remained in possession of only one battleship and three frigates in the entire Eastern Mediterranean. The British fleet sailed away after the hostilities, leaving behind only a small force under the command of Vice Admiral Sidney Smith, who was made a commodore. He commanded a fleet of ten ships, two of which were its flagships (HMS *Theseus* and HMS *Tigre*); the others were smaller vessels taken as bounty from the French fleet. This balance of power gave the Royal Navy absolute sea control, which allowed Great Britain to undertake a series of maritime activities that thwarted Napoleon's plans. From this point on, for the duration of Napoleon's campaign, the Royal Navy maintained its control of the Eastern Mediterranean. Great Britain took advantage of this control to help its Ottoman allies repel Napoleon's invasion, until victory on the battlefield.

Great Britain's sea control was expressed in several maritime strategies:

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)[3]

Vice Admiral Sidney Smith leveraged his sea control to deny access to the small remaining naval forces under Napoleon's command in the relevant theater. Thus, on March 20, 1799, ahead of the Siege of Acre, nine small French boats escorted by a corvette arrived

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[3]   Military capabilities used to prevent or constrain the deployment of opposing forces into a given
        Theater of operations and reduce their freedom of maneuver once in a theater (Simon, 2017).

off the coast of Acre, carrying heavy siege cannons sent by sea because they could not be transported overland through Egypt. HMS *Tigre*, under Smith's command, captured the convoy: seven ships surrendered, while the corvette and two other ships managed to escape. The cannons and ammunition that would have been the main artillery for the conquest of the heavily fortified city of Acre fell into British hands, who transferred them to the besieged Ottomans in Acre. The captured ships were added to the British fleet. The capture of the siege cannons had a decisive effect. Without them, Napoleon was forced to shell Acre's walls using smaller field cannons his force carried on its journey from Egypt. With such limited firepower, he had to concentrate his efforts to breach the walls on a single point, which allowed the city's defenders, with the support of British marines who landed at Acre Port, to build another interior wall and thus stop Napoleon's forces from breaking into the city (Gihon, ibid.).

Firepower support for ground forces

Sea control allowed Britain to provide backup for ground forces with supplementary firepower. This assistance comprised two elements:

- **Artillery support**: Sea control allowed the British to provide firepower to their Ottoman allies, besieged in Acre, from their shipborne cannons. Several battleships, led by HMS *Theseus* (with its 74 cannons), took position north of Acre; others, led by HMS *Tigre* (80 cannons), mobilized to its south. These cannons caught Napoleon's army, besieging the city, in a crossfire. This was an extraordinary display of firepower, considering the number of supporting cannons (Urman, 1983).

- **Amphibious support**: British marines serving on these ships, having landed at the Port of Acre, helped to reinforce the city's fortifications, conducted ground incursions against French siege instruments, and during Napoleon's last massive assault after he breached the external wall, played an active role in the battle to defend the city (Urman, ibid).

Sea lines of communication (SLOC)

Sea control allowed the British to secure the sea lines of communication (SLOC). These sea lines were Napoleon's only means of maintaining, supplying, and reinforcing his army. On the other hand, these sea lines, secured by the British, allowed Acre's defenders to receive reinforcements without having to cross the ground-based siege of the city that Napoleon had laid. Britain's sea control blocked France's logistical and military capabilities both in Egypt, where the main invasion force remained, and at the siege of Acre itself. This control also allowed the Ottomans to bring in reinforcements and supplies from Rhodes to Acre by sea, via lanes secured by the British. During the Siege of Acre, Britain's sea

control meant that their besieged Ottoman allies enjoyed supplies of food, arms, and ammunition, while the French forces besieging Acre had to ration their ammunition and suffered from permanent gunpowder shortages.

Port blockades

The Royal Navy's strategy in the Mediterranean, thanks to its sea control, included a local siege of the Nile Estuary, where a surviving fragment of the French fleet from the Battle of Abukir was stationed. This French force managed to escape the siege and deliver supplies to Napoleon's forces at Gaza, and owing to the shortages of the ground force, the French fleet transferred some of its shipborne cannons and most of its ammunition. This faction was caught by a British flotilla on June 18, 1799, as it retreated back toward the Port of Toulon. The tactic of port blockades thus contributed both to Britain's maintenance of its sea control and to its tactical and strategic achievements.

Lessons for the State of Israel from Napoleon's failed invasion—then and now

We note similarities between the predicament of Napoleon's invading army in Egypt and the Land of Israel in the eighteenth century and the State of Israel's geostrategic position in the twenty-first century:

- The same geographic area: the eastern shore of the Mediterranean Sea, from Gaza to Acre, and the adjacent coastlines.
- The ground forces' superiority over their enemies in terms of equipment, organization, and means of control and assistance.
- The encirclement of ground forces by hostile entities, separating them from territorial connections to sources of supplies and reinforcements.

The present situation of the State of Israel: background

Since the establishment of the State of Israel, its maritime strategy has been based on the pursuit of sea control for its navy with the assistance of its air force, naval commando forces, and coastal array of radar stations. Its efforts to achieve this goal in the maritime theater were directed mainly against enemy navies from Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, against their coastal defenses, and against naval incursions from various terror organizations. This warfare, besides special operations and activities to secure shipping routes, may be characterized as littoral warfare:

> The term "littoral warfare" pertains to the maritime zone adjacent to the coast (from the Latin for "coastal", *litoralis*). There is no single, agreed-upon definition for

this area, although the U.S. Navy defines it as extending from the beach/shore to a depth of 60m (200 feet). This definition is disputed, and some argue that the right definition must take into account the shore-based force's detection and weapons capabilities, thus expanding this zone to a range of up to 50 miles (Chorev, 2021).

In the theater of littoral warfare, Israel has enjoyed clear sea control. It has not faced restrictions in operating opposite enemy shores or against enemy warships or coastal defenses.

Owing to the Israeli Navy's operational success in the Yom Kippur War of 1973, Israel achieved sea control against enemy navies, and local sea control wherever needed against enemy coastal defenses, which were mainly oriented to detection and less equipped to attack targets at sea, a task that was the responsibility of the enemy fleets. The INS *Hanit* incident — a missile strike against an Israeli ship in 2006 — shocked the Israeli Navy and led it to understand that threats to its sea control came not only from enemy fleets but also from enemy coastal defenses, and not necessarily from state actors, but rather asymmetrically also from terror organizations, chiefly Hezbollah, which Iran was using as a proxy.[4] This success, from the enemy's perspective, led to the reinforcement of its coastal defenses with advanced surface-to-sea missiles, in terms of their quantity, quality, and operating methodologies. These coastal defenses, equipped with surface-to-sea missiles, radar-based detection systems, and other reconnaissance capabilities, now pose a challenge to the Israeli Navy's pursuit of sea control in this arena. We shall now briefly survey these capabilities, in light of their discernible impact on Israel's ability to achieve local sea control in this theater and because of the substantive differences with Napoleon's situation, which serves us for both inspiration and comparison.

Hezbollah's naval formation is of limited scope, but in cases of littoral warfare, it may prove effective. This effort spans hundreds of militants, who are considered elite warriors (Beeri, June 29, 2022).

Hezbollah is building up its own fleet of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which are active in maritime missions, both as remotely guided instruments and as independent vehicles with inert platforms immune to cyberattacks and effective against static targets.[5] These vehicles have observation capabilities and are apparently also able to conduct "suicide" attacks and even launch armaments. The total number of UAVs of all varieties in Hezbollah's possession is estimated to be over 2,000 (Beeri, July 3, 2022).

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[4]   Asymmetric warfare is a situation in which "there is a fundamental difference between the warring sides in terms of their military or economic power" (Chorev, 2021). In this case: Hezbollah as a non-state actor organized as a militia against the State of Israel's navy.

[5]   Lecture by Prof. Isaac Ben-Israel in Kiryat Tivon, July 7, 2022.

Hezbollah's maritime forces include naval commandos, trained to conduct maritime incursions on boats and dive to different distances and depths, and apparently also midget submarines for transportation or attack purposes. Hezbollah's naval operations also have possession of attack boats.

Hezbollah's stockpiles of surface-to-sea missiles include batteries of C-802 missiles with a range of 65 nautical miles. Their efficiency was proven with the strike on the INS *Hanit* in 2006, as we have mentioned. It is possible that Hezbollah also possesses Russian-made ultrasonic Yakhont missiles, with a maximum speed of 2.6 Mach and a range of 165 nautical miles (Beeri, June 29, 2002).

In conclusion, as the commander of the Israeli Navy said in 2018: "Hezbollah has built the best missile boat in the world: it has many missiles and it's unsinkable" (Maj. Gen. Eli Sharvit, Commander of the Israeli Navy, January 2018).[6] What insights, therefore, may be drawn from the similarities and differences between the present predicament of the State of Israel and that of Napoleon's expeditionary force in terms of the significance of sea control for land battles?

Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD)

In Napoleon's case, the Royal Navy had unfettered access to all parts of the Eastern Mediterranean. Its absolute sea control allowed it to reach any place it wished along the coastline of the Land of Israel, except for in the immediate vicinity of Acre, which was threatened by Napoleon's short-range cannons.

Nowadays, the enemy's coastal defense systems in the northern theater have created a threatened zone with a range delineated by the range of its weapons and detection capabilities. Considering the enemy's abilities, inserting the Israeli Navy into these areas would involve significant risk for its forces. Israel's ability to access these areas for operational purposes has not been totally denied, but such operations must now be planned with extreme caution and performed in conjunction with other IDF forces, understanding that as long as the enemy retains these abilities, even if temporarily neutralized, any local control that is achieved will be for a time-limited period, in delimited territory.

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6   Rothman, Eli (January 3, 2018). "It would be the 'Third Lebanon War': Hezbollah used weapons to attack the gas rigs", *Kikar HaShabbat*. [Hebrew]

Firepower support for ground forces

In the course of the battle for Acre, the Royal Navy anchored some of its warships north and south of the city during Napoleon's siege, beyond the range of his field cannons, and the British cannons onboard these ships supported the Ottoman forces besieged in Acre with firepower against the attackers.

Nowadays, firepower support for ground forces in the context of multidimensional warfare requires, in most cases, naval activity within range of the coast. In order to provide significant firepower support, a navy must use large vessels carrying heavier and more numerous weapons. In the current situation of the theater and the enemy's capabilities, with the deployment of advanced surface-to-sea missiles along the enemy coastline, the Israeli Navy is intensely vulnerable. The Israeli Navy's lack of sea control will harm its ability to provide firepower support to ground forces, unless such control — at minimum, temporary local control — may be achieved.

Amphibious landings (landing operations from the sea)

Sidney Smith's ships, which performed several limited landing operations during the battle for Acre, were able to do so because Britain's doctrine of power projection from the sea was fundamental to its operation of its naval forces, including through the permanent stationing of marine forces on its battleships.[7] Similarly, since Britain's sea control in the region was unquestionable, the danger to its marine forces in transit to the coast and to the seacraft that bore them was minor.

Nowadays, amphibious landing operations to achieve objectives on land, whether as a primary mission or in support of other ground forces — an ability that may be defined as a form of power projection from the sea — are difficult and dangerous missions in the absence of sea control, such as in the case of amphibious landings conducted by Israel:

> In September 1969, Israel conducted Operation Raviv, in which three landing craft were loaded with tanks and APCs in the Sinai Peninsula (Ras Sedr) and landed them on the western shore of the Gulf of Suez. Earlier, the Israeli Navy had conducted Operation Escort to ensure its sea control in the theater and to secure the passage of the defenseless landing craft. During Operation Peace for the Galilee (the First Lebanon War), the Israeli Navy possessed sea control and faced no significant enemy when landing forces on the coast. From all these historical examples, we see that sea control is a minimal condition for the performance of operational maneuvers from the sea and amphibious landings. An amphibious invasion force carries precious and

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7   Power projection from the sea is defined as a state's ability to deploy forces from the sea in territory beyond its borders and to maintain them (USA Dictionary of Military Terms, 2013).

immensely important cargo on its ships, but at the same time has no significant abilities to protect this cargo. (Spanier, 2022)

Securing Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC)

Napoleon's army in Egypt and the Land of Israel was totally dependent on reinforcements from France via the sea. Given Britain's sea control, shipping lanes were almost hermetically sealed, and Napoleon was unable to secure reinforcements and thus suffered from an erosion of his forces, both because of battlefield casualties and because of deaths from the epidemic that blighted his army owing to the unsanitary conditions and contaminated water. In terms of supplies, Napoleon was forced to rely on the original supplies that he had brought with him and on whatever he could buy or confiscate from the locals. Napoleon's army outside Acre was surrounded by territory controlled by, or supportive of, his Ottoman enemies, such that this route was similarly blocked.

Nowadays, Israel, as a kind of island nation, is 98 percent reliant in terms of weight and 65 percent in financial terms on maritime freight (Gonen, 2021). Both military and civilian supplies are vulnerable to potential attacks on shipping lanes in the Mediterranean near Israel's ports by means of surface-to-sea missiles launched from enemy territory at merchant vessels along the coast and in the nation's ports and waiting areas outside its ports. In the absence of Israeli sea control, the scenario in which shipping off Israel's shores might be curtailed is a realistic and concerning possibility.

Port blockades

Back then, if Napoleon had possessed sea control, he could have blockaded the Port of Acre in tandem with his land siege, thus cutting it off from its regular supplies, including reinforcements from the island of Rhodes provided by and under the protection of the Royal Navy. Traditionally, port blockades are conducted by naval forces, acting to prevent any passage in or out of enemy ports.

Nowadays, in certain geographic conditions, the development of surface-to-sea missiles renders port blockades possible without the involvement of naval forces. Thus, it is not inconceivable that the ports at Haifa and even Ashdod and Hadera might find themselves under a de facto blockade, with their docking areas and piers within range of surface-to-sea missiles, while being exposed to the enemy's land-based intelligence lookouts from the direction of land, which could be used to coordinate and direct enemy fire. This paper does not discuss the possibility of cyberattacks on ports, but their effective obstruction by surface-to-sea missiles in the northern theater is a significant threat, which may deprive Israel of a large share of its imports, even if the Port of Eilat remains operational (Gonen, 2021).

Attacks on / protection of strategic assets at sea

Another issue regarding which it is impossible to make a comparison with our test case of the implications of sea control for Napoleon's invasion, but which is pertinent to a discussion of Israel's present situation, is that as of November 2022, there are several gas rigs off Israel's shores, as part of efforts to search for, extract, and transport gas from the seabed; a number of liquefaction and gasification facilities are planned. An attack on any of these or future platforms would jeopardize the State of Israel's energy security, create a grave environmental pollution hazard, and harm Israel's reputation as a state capable of protecting its sovereignty, with all that would entail for its powers of deterrence. Neither the British, nor the French, nor the Ottomans had such assets in the time period that this paper discusses, and therefore no such comparison can be made. Nevertheless, it is clear that defending these assets demands a heightened level of sea control, limited neither by time nor by place:

> The ability to realize the full scope of opportunities in the maritime domain hinges on an ability to attain and maintain superiority therein. In the Israeli Navy, sea control is defined as the freedom of movement of vessels to perform their missions in the pursuit of war objectives, while causing damage to enemy systems. Sea control is a means that serves an end, not an end in itself. (Saar Salma, 2020)

It is important to note that this definition, by the then-commander of the Israeli Navy, is not necessarily consistent with academic distinctions between sea control and various degrees of maritime command, but the meaning of his remarks is perfectly clear: he is using "sea control" in the sense of "local control."

Discussion and conclusion

The key factor behind Napoleon's defeat was Britain's sea control in the Eastern Mediterranean. Britain's control of maritime supply lanes, obstruction of enemy naval access, port blockades, firepower support to ground forces, and amphibious landings from the sea — all these resulted from Britain's absolute sea control in the Eastern Mediterranean. The State of Israel's position on the Mediterranean coastline and dependence on that coastline for its main supply routes is fundamentally similar to that of Napoleon's expeditionary force. But unlike in Napoleon's case, the emergence of surface-to-sea missiles and UAVs in the modern State of Israel's theater of war in the Eastern Mediterranean, which is fundamentally a form of littoral warfare, poses a genuine and tangible threat to the possibility of attaining sea control, even in a local form, with sea vessels alone.

Overcoming the enemy's coastal defenses demands a different way of thinking from the State of Israel's traditional approach to securing sea control by means of its navy. It requires a multidimensional combat strategy. In other words, sea control must be secured in order to overcome the enemy's capabilities, and this may be done only through a combination of sea-to-shore, air-to-shore, and auxiliary cyber warfare, together with intelligence and control across multiple branches of the military. Such a strategy cannot rely, as in the past, only on naval forces but rather requires action to adapt the State of Israel's overall power, including its maritime power, to secure sea control by doing the following:

- Adapting weapons systems on naval vessels to attack targets on land that threaten this sea control;

- Adapting the defensive weapons systems on these naval vessels against new threats from the direction of the shore;

- Methodologically and operationally implementing a multidimensional and multibranch capability to detect and attack land targets, including for amphibious landings when needed, to project power from the sea;

- Establishing a command-and-control mechanism compatible with this doctrine of multidimensional integration in general, and in the context of attacking land targets in particular.

Thus, ahead of a future conflict on the northern front, the State of Israel will be able to maintain sufficient local sea control, differently from in the past, in a way that will enable it to guarantee its freedom of maritime movement to and from its shores and that will enable it to back up its ground forces with firepower and amphibious landings, to restrict the enemy's ability to threaten strategic assets, and to guarantee victory in land battles — the same victory that was denied to Napoleon in 1799 because of his lack of sea control.

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