

MARITIME STRATEGIC EVALUATION FOR ISRAEL 2022/23

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The Iranian Strategy Following the War in Ukraine

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The fate of the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA) is still unclear, while Iran continues its traditional diplomacy without any significant changes. Iran did not expect the Russians to invade Ukraine, and so did other regional and global players. The new state of events forced Iranian leadership to maneuver skillfully in order to achieve political gains, nevertheless it did not alterate Iranian stance radically. This article illustrates Iran's updated security views to the Israeli reader following the war in Ukraine and evaluates the possible Iranian reactions in the coming year; the reduced chances for re-signing the nuclear deal are taken in account as well. In addition, the article examines certain changes in Iranian naval strategy in the Persian Gulf.

Iran's Security and Threats Perceptions

The Iranian regime is convinced there are several main threats that it has to defend against:

- The United States since 1979 – The Iranian regime suspects that the United States intends to change its regime and its Islamic nature, including by a 'cultural attack', i.e., Western cultural influence.
- Israel.
- Saudi Arabia's support for Sunni Jihadist movements (in Iran's opinion).
- Complicated challenges around Iran's breached borders.¹

The threats also dictate national interests, in which the survival of the regime is the primary interest. It means not only the physical survival but also the continuation of the regime of the Islamic revolution, also known as Velâyat-e Faqih (The Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist), which grants the leader supreme authority over any elected president. There are four essential Iranian interests:

1. The regime is determined to protect itself against internal and external threats; keeping in mind that most Shiites outside of Iran had never embraced the Iranian ideology.
2. Deterrence: Iran is aware that most of its rivals, including Israel, have larger quantities of superior conventional weapons. As a result, Iran invests in developing asymmetric capabilities, which include missiles and activating foreign proxies.

¹ Gawdat Bahgat and Anoushervan Ehteshami, *Defending Iran: From Revolutionary Guards to Ballistic Missiles* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021).

3. Retaliation: The asymmetric capabilities are designed to serve as another deterrence leverage if Iranian deterrence fails. In such a case, Tehran will unleash its asymmetric response by using missiles, drones, and pro-Iranian militias attacks, to cover for failing to prevent the enemy from attacking. Yet Iran resorts to all of the aforementioned capabilities to carry out its regional policies.
4. Power Projection: Iran sees itself as a regional power. The asymmetric capabilities are meant to persuade neighboring countries to prefer cooperation with Iran over conflict.²

On the one hand, most of the research literature on Iran's security doctrine is reluctant to thoroughly analyze issues of Iranian behavior, especially relating to Israel. Moreover, there is an unwillingness to analyze these perceptions critically. It has been argued that Iranian policy is after all pragmatic and not so different from other regimes.³ On the other hand, there are many Israeli opinions regarding the Iranian nuclear program, on the right and on the left, but they do not discuss the essence of Iranian strategy, and rather focus either on the nuclear program, or its existential threat to Israel.⁴

The Ideological Structure of the Iranian Regime

The Effects of Modern Ideology

Iran's regime is not unique in being Shiite or Islamic since many nations in the Middle East abide by Sharia law. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan define themselves as Islamic republics. What makes Iran unique is the ideology that celebrates the Islamic revolution. Iran's leader Ali Khamenei often regards himself as 'a revolutionist',⁵ that is due to the fact that the Iranian Islamist movements were directly influenced by Marxism. The defining myth of Shiite Islam is the Martyrdom of Imam Hussein in the battle of Karbala in 680 AD. The myth has metamorphosed since then thanks to modern interpretation by Islamic revolution harbinger Ali Shariati (1933-1977) who was influenced by Marxism and interpreted many Islamic terms based upon the fundamentals of Marxist ideas. His commentaries are widespread across Iran and embraced by the founder of the Islamic

² Ibid, pp. 11–12.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Gad Ivgy. "[Existential Danger: Lapid's Strategic Failure](#)", *Mida*, August 31, 2022 (Hebrew); Noah Shamir. "[The Iranian Nuclear Program is not an existential threat. Israel needs another strategy](#)", *Haaretz*, July 8, 2021 (Hebrew).

⁵ "[Man, diplomat nistam, man enghelabiyam](#)", "I am not a diplomat, I am a revolutionary" (*Rajanews*, February 8, 2013).

Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.⁶ Based on this interpretation, Hussein's heroic death was one of an unrelenting fight against injustice. The Islamic discourse embraced terms such as 'Oppressed on Earth' (Mostazafin) and "Global Arrogance" (Astakhbar-y Jahani or Mustakbarin). Khomeini's assistant, Ayatollah Mohammad Hussain Beheshti, who more than anyone else developed the new Islamic discourse, emphasized the importance of a political ideology or a doctrine in addition to other aspects of Islam.⁷

Resemblance to Communist Totalitarianism

As a result of the encounter with European influences Islam in Iran took shape of a completely modern political ideology. Moreover, the terminology and vocabulary of the Islamic revolution themselves are not only modern but borrowed from the West, starting with the term "Revolution". Therefore, the Iranian Islamic regime is not 'Medieval' or 'retrograde,' but modern and in some of its characteristics similar to modern authoritarian regimes. Of course, similarity doesn't mean identity, and yet there is a basis for analogy and comparison.

The revolutionary aspect had several consequences, some are strategic and long-term. One of them is a confrontation stance vis-à-vis Israel and the United States, that in Iran's eyes, represent a global hegemony. That is because the revolution inherently requires enemies, both foreign and domestic. This position perpetuates Iran's behavior as a revisionist power.

S.N. Eisenstadt pointed out a resemblance between the French Revolution's Jacobins to modern religious fundamentalists. He saw them as the modern Jacobins. The 18th-century revolutionary Jacobins championed the values of Enlightenment that the French Revolution supported; however, they claimed to represent the people without asking their opinion and determined that it was their right and even their duty to take every measure, including violence and terror, to bring the ignorant masses and the opponents to an enlightened revolutionary consciousness, be it through the guillotine. The Jacobins were the first in history to use violence in the name of distinct humanist values.⁸

A fundamentalist approach is not limited to Islam alone. It is a monotheistic religion's response to the challenges of modernity. It is not a complete rejection of the West or

⁶ Ervand Ebrahimian, "[Ali Shariati: Ideologue of the Iranian Revolution](#)", *Middle East Report*, 102, January/February 1982.

⁷ Mohammad-Hosseini Beheshti, *Mabani-ye Nazariye Ghanun-e Asasi* (Theoretical Fundamentals of the Constitution), (Tehran: Bonyad-e Nashr-e Asar-e Shahid-e Beheshti, 2001), 22–25.

⁸ S.N. Eisenstadt, *Fundamentalism, Sectarianism, and Revolution: The Jacobin Dimension of Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

modernism, but rather a selective appropriation of their values. Therefore, religious fundamentalism is by definition a modern phenomenon. Since the revolution, the Iranian regime went through many transformations following the purges and the Iran-Iraq war, but it remains the same regime that advocates the same values, that is to say, an inflexible ideology that relies on the state of perpetual conflict with the world's superpowers and Israel.⁹ Moreover, there is no revolution without confrontation. It implies that as long as the Iranian regime insists on the revolutionary dimension of its essence, it needs confrontation. Otherwise, the regime's rhetoric risks becoming a lip-service, which is wrought with risks for the regime's credibility and survivability.

An Existential Need to Preserve the Ideology

Ali Khamenei has been leading Iran since 1989. He has proven to be a responsible and pragmatic leader; although it is important to understand these 'positive' descriptions in the context of Iranian reality. In other words, Khamenei has never taken any action that would make him seem reckless or warmongering. The leader of Iran is working to ensure the survival of his regime; however, it is necessary to clarify this determination and analyze the implications in a historic and national reality. In other words, how should the regime act to guarantee both the protection of Iran and the survival of the political revolutionary regime?

- **The revolution must continue** – Khamenei is aware of the fact that there cannot be any reforms without a profound change of the regime. For example, ending the conflict with the USA and Israel won't allow the regime to call itself revolutionary; it would then be widely known as merely empty slogans without any real content. If such developments occur, the regime will lose credibility and deterrence not only with geopolitical rivals but with citizens at home as well. The regime cannot afford to settle for exclusively verbal conflicts with the USA and Israel; it must carry the revolution's decree into practice. If that applies only verbally, it would be perceived as cynical and hypocritical, and automatically translated to the loss of credibility and deterrence mentioned before. Clearly, Khamenei or his successors will find it difficult to legitimize their rule if the regime does not stick to its revolutionary definitions and the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist.
- **Avoiding escalation or war** – Khamenei and other senior regime officials took part in the Iran-Iraq war and are aware of the heavy price the Iranian people paid in that war. In spite of ongoing oppression, the Iranian regime is alert to the public's feelings and their fear of war. Furthermore, the leadership is aware of Iran's weaknesses; Iran

⁹ G. Almond, S. Appleby and E. Sivan, *Strong Religion: The Rise of Fundamentalisms around the World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

is a vast country, but in the absence of a modern army it has difficulties maintaining its borders. The Iranian army, including the Revolutionary Guards, lacks mobility and quick reaction forces. It is clear to them that Iran cannot endure conventional warfare with a rival state. Therefore, Iran conducts its regional activities to achieve long-term objectives, but at the same time avoids taking actions that would ensure a severe military response.

- **Emphasizing the asymmetric capability** – In the absence of means or capability, Iran's conventional military force is limited. Therefore, the optimal solution the leadership had found is investing in asymmetric capabilities, which spreads over several fields:
 - Missiles and drones.
 - Supporting 'proxies' like Hezbollah in Lebanon, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Houthis in Yemen, and deploying precision-strike missiles in Syria; in addition to changing the Syrian demographic balance in favor of Shiites.
 - Hezbollah's global networks, especially in South America and Africa, rely on Shiite communities and work in favor of Iran.¹⁰
 - Nuclear weapons serve a purpose not as a weapon of war, but as a geopolitical power multiplier. It is likely that the regime's main goal in achieving nuclear weapons is to ensure its immunity.¹¹

Iran, like any other nation, is subjected to various constraints and contradictory. It is worth noting that the depiction of Iran's policies as a dichotomy of either "pragmatic" or "ideologist" doesn't represent Iran realistically. Since no country is driven by ideology or utilitarian interests alone, every regime in every nation has constant ideologic and pragmatic considerations. Yet in each case, pragmatic or ideological considerations may be given varying weight. Pragmatism is not tantamount to moderation; it is the awareness of the cost of taking a certain step. Moreover, describing the national interest as only economically beneficial is a frequent mistake.¹² Iran conducts itself very pragmatically with (Christian) Armenia but avoids anything that Israelis or Westerners might see as pragmatism in relation to Israel.

Thus, subject to its national interests, Iran integrates both realism and ideology in its policy, but ideology is taken into consideration in foreign policy significantly more than by

¹⁰ It is important to distinguish between 'proxies' and allies or clients. 'Proxies' are completely under Iranian subordination and are not independent. This means that Hezbollah's decision making is set by Tehran, although Hezbollah has its internal Lebanese considerations. Iran did not establish Hamas or Houthis; They are sponsored but not subjected.

¹¹ Elliot Hen-Tov, "[Understanding Iran's New Authoritarianism](#)", *The Washington Quarterly*, 30, no. 1 (2007): 163–179.

¹² Edward Luttwak, *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, Revised and Enlarged Edition* (Belknap Press, 2002): 211–214.

other countries. The Iranian national interest is influenced by real-politic considerations; however, the Islamic Republic's ideological goals are an integral part of national interest.¹³

The Implications of the War in Ukraine on Iran's Grand Strategy

Iran was surprised by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Even on this issue the Iranian regime is subjected to various constraints and is not overall supportive of Russia. Khamenei and other government officials blame NATO for the war; yet, genuine support for the actions of the Kremlin cannot be found in Iranian media.¹⁴ Former president Ahmadinejad tweeted a supporting message in English for Ukraine's Jewish president Zelenskyy.¹⁵ Relations between Iran and Russia existed for hundreds of years, but they have always been complex. Russia, as well as the Soviet Union, encroached on Iranian territories. To this day, these two nations are far from harmonious and mutually respectful.¹⁶ The Iranian regime is aware that among Iranian people there is resentment towards Putin's regime.¹⁷ This requires the regime to maintain balance and refrain from exhibiting support for the war, at least in public.

Unofficial statements of top-ranking Iranian officers give a clear impression that Iran is learning from the war in Ukraine.

1. **Nuclear deterrence must be kept** – Many commentators as well as Iranian officers determine that the invasion was possible because Ukraine decided, under US sponsorship, to give up on its nuclear arsenal (which it had upon the breakup of the

¹³ Ebrahim Aghamohammadi, "[Bonydha-ye ideolojik-e dar Siyasat-e Khareji-ye Jumhuri-ye Eslami-ye Iran](#)" (Ideologic Elements in the Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran), *Hokumat-e Eslami*, 85 (January 2018): 79–102; Shahruz Ebrahimi, "[Barrasi va-Asazane-ye Naqsh-e Ideoloji dar Siyasat-e Khareji-ye Iran va Payvand-e an ba Vaghegerai va Armangerai](#)" (A constructive examination of the role of ideology in Iranian foreign policy, as well as its relationship to realism and idealism), *Fasname-ye Beynalmelal va Ravabet-e Khareji* (Journal of International Relations), 4 (2009): 112–138.

¹⁴ H. Amirabdollahian, "[The crisis in Ukraine is rooted in NATO's provocative actions. We do not consider resorting to war as a solution. Establishing a ceasefire and focusing on a political and democratic solution is a necessity](#)", Twitter, February 24, 2022; Khamenei website, "[The NATO Expansion is the Real Reason behind the Ukraine Crisis](#)", June 25, 2022.

¹⁵ Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "[The great nation of #Ukraine President #Zelenskyy Your honorable and almost unrivalled resistance uncovered the Satanic plots of enemies of mankind. Trust that the great nation of #Iran is standing by you,while admiring this heroic persistence](#)", Twitter, March 2, 2022

¹⁶ Denis V. Volkov, "[Bringing democracy into Iran: A Russian project for the separation of Azerbaijan](#)", *Middle Eastern Studies*, 58, no. 6 (2022): 989–1003.

¹⁷ "[Khaterat-e talkh, Angare-ye Iran az Hamsaye-ye Shimali Ast](#)" (Black thoughts: The image of the Northern Neighbor in the eyes of Iranians), *Ensafnews*, May 31, 2022.

Soviet Union), which was a critical mistake. If Ukraine retained its nuclear weapons the Russians would never dare to attack; therefore, nuclear deterrence must be kept.¹⁸ A claim from a top-ranking Iranian military official leaves little room for doubt regarding the military destiny of the Irani nuclear program. Khamenei's representative in Qazvin, Abdelkarim Abedini, stated in his Friday sermon on February 25, 2022, that "the Americans are trying to disarm the Iranian nation, and impose the fate of Ukraine on it."¹⁹ The leader's senior advisor, Kamal Kharazi, stated that Iran has the ability to develop nuclear weapons although it had not yet decided to.²⁰

2. **The strategic importance of missiles** – The war in Ukraine proved to Iran that military capabilities are more important than international support. The Russian use of missiles is a valuable lesson for Iran. Revolutionary Guards officers observe Ukraine's inability to inflict damage on Russia for its lack of long-range missiles. The Revolutionary Guards' bulletin published an article stating that "the missiles create a balance of terror, and force diplomacy on the enemy."²¹ It should be noted that the article also discusses Ukraine's decision to dismantle its nuclear arsenal, and additionally mentions Thomas Schelling's views on nuclear deterrence. There is no doubt that the article implies not ordinary tactical missiles, but ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warhead.

Deputy chief of staff of the Iranian army, Aziz Nasirzadeh, spoke out in an even more explicit way. According to him, the main lesson from the Ukraine war is that "the Ukrainians gave up nuclear capability while nuclear weapons provide deterrence. A crisis ensued as a result. Some of our people hold the same thoughts; they mean that we should give up on offensive capabilities and strive for peace. In today's reality, it is impossible to ignore military capabilities or deterrence. The weaker we get, the more we will be attacked." Nasirzadeh also spoke about combining Iran's missile capabilities with the support for proxies, the latter are known as the 'Axis of Resistance': "The geography of the Iranian resistance has expanded. Thanks to self-production capabilities the resistance front has expanded, so today it can produce its own weaponry."²²

18 ["Amir Naserzadeh: Jang-e Ukrain Darsha-ye Moheni baraye Iran Darad"](#) (Amir Nasirzadeh: The war in Ukraine may teach Iran many important lessons), *IRNA News*.

19 ["Raftar-e tahghiramiz-e Amerika ba Raisejumphur-e Ukrain dars-ebrat gharbzadeha bashad"](#) (The humiliating treatment of the Ukrainian president by the United States should serve as a lesson for those who support the West), *hawzahnews*, March 16, 2022.

20 [Khamenei's Foreign Policy Advisor Kamal Kharrazi: Iran Has Become a Nuclear Threshold Country](#), *MEMRI TV Videos*.

21 [Arziabiy-e nashriy-e Sepa az Amuzahaye Jang-e Ukrain Chist](#) (The lessons the Irani Revolutionary Guards bulletin learn from the war in Ukrain), *donya-e-eqtesad*, February 28, 2022.

22 See 18: ["Amir Nasirzadeh: Jang-e Ukrain Darsha-ye Moheni baraye Iran Darad"](#) (Amir Nasirzadeh: The war in Ukraine may teach Iran many important lessons), *Al-Alam*, February 28, 2022.

In September 2022, Iran supplied its manufactured UAVs to Russia; Russia doesn't own sufficient weapons of that grade. It's been reported that the Russians used two types of Iranian UAVs: Mohajer-6 and Shahed-136. Iran refused to comment on these reports. It is doubtful that this weapon will be Russia's strategic advantage in the war with Ukraine, but it is an opportunity for the Iranian industrial complex to test these weapons in war conditions. These are two completely different weapons: while the Mohajer-6 is an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle, the Shahed-136 is categorized as Loitering Munition.²³

The war in Ukraine did not change Iran's strategic assessments, but it has persuaded the leadership that its current strategy is correct:

- The nuclear program is a strategic asset (whether it be of a nuclear threshold state or a finalized nuclear weapon). The main lesson of the war in Ukraine is that "a country like Iran must not give up its nuclear shield."²⁴ Hence, an agreement with Iran that would include irreversible concession on its nuclear shield is impossible.
- Missiles and missile supply for proxies are a strategic layer in Iran's deterrence against Israel. Thus, Iran would never agree to discuss its ballistic missile program or its regional policies, i.e., supporting resistance groups.
- The fact that Iran insists on continuing its ballistic missile development is an indirect proof of its aspiration to achieve nuclear weapons. Even though it is technically possible to develop non-nuclear long-range ballistic missiles, in practice, such development is pointless. Every nation in the world that achieved long-range ballistic capabilities has acquired nuclear weapons.

Iran's Naval Strategy

The Iranian regime has never officially drawn up a military doctrine or a grand strategy, including naval strategic perceptions. One can assume that the naval strategy is under general Iranian considerations regarding the Persian Gulf. The Iranian naval strategy is born out of a need to resist the American presence in the Gulf. Since 2016, Iran adopted an offensive naval strategy and continued employing it in response to President Trump's maximum pressure policy. Furthermore, Iran instituted a forward-defense,²⁵ which can be described as defense through offense. Mohammad Pakpour, Commander of the

²³ Douglas Barrie. "[Explainer: Russia Deploys Iranian Drones](#)", *The Iran Primer*, October 12, 2022.

²⁴ Ukrain, Asr-E Moshakha, na Goftamanaha: "[Ukraine, it is an era of missiles, not 'that of talks'](#)", *Hamshahri*, February 22, 2022.

²⁵ Ali Bagheri Dolatabadi & Mehran Kamrava. "[Iran's changing naval strategy in the Persian Gulf: Motives and features](#)", *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, July 27, 2022.

Revolutionary Guards Ground Forces, determined that "Iran's doctrine in its essence is defensive, but operatively and tactically it is offensive."²⁶

According to leader Khamenei, the Iranian navy is the frontline of state defense.²⁷ It is unclear what are the implications of those words to the Iranian navy, but there are a few new characteristics of Iranian offensive perceptions in maritime space that can be pointed out:

1. The Revolutionary Guards fleet is based on speedboats or light ships capable of harassing American ships or other national's vessels.
2. Most naval platforms are capable of carrying missiles and air-defense systems that support naval operations.
3. Iranian ships patrol several disputed islands that both Iran and the United Arab Emirates claim.
4. Iranian naval forces conduct exercises that simulate offensive actions. It can be concluded that the naval strategy is evolving from merely defending territorial waters to offensive actions against enemies.²⁸

In September 2022, the Revolutionary Guard unveiled a new missile corvette named '*Shahid Solemani*'. This corvette is the first of three catamarans with stealth abilities. Admiral Alireza Tangsiri, commander of the Revolutionary Guards Navy, announced that this vessel has a 9,000 km range; far exceeding the limits of the Persian Gulf.²⁹ In 2018, the Iranian parliament legislated the Naval Industries Merger Act. According to this law, all the companies that used to manufacture ships, instruments, or equipment intended for the navy were merged into one company named "The Marine Industries Organization."³⁰

The Iranian navy along with the rest of the armed forces integrates into the overall asymmetric perception. As such, it has been satisfied with harassing American ships sailing the Gulf, as well as other ships. These recurring incidents follow the same fixed

²⁶ "[Iran's Military Strategy Offensive at Operational, Tactical Levels: IRGC Commander](#)", *Tasneem News Agency*, December 22, 2018.

²⁷ "[Emam Khamenei: Niruy-e Daryai Dar Khatt-e Moghadam-e Defa' Az Keshvar Ast](#)" (The Navy is the Forefront Defense of the Country), *Tasnim News Agency*, November 28, 2017.

²⁸ Dolatabadi & Kamrava, 2022.

²⁹ Farzan Nadimi, [New Iranian Warship Signals Longer Maritime Reach, More Aggressive Strategy](#), *Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy*, September 16, 2022.

³⁰ [Ghanun-e Edghram-e Sherkatha va-Tashkil Sazman-e Sanay-e Daryaiy-e Niruha-ye Mosalah](#), *Majles Website*, January 19, 2019.

script: fast Revolutionary Guards ships approach American battleships.³¹ In principle, the Iranian navy can also harass Israeli merchant ships in the Persian Gulf.³² Due to technical and geopolitical constraints, there is no correlation between Iran's hegemonic ambitions and its existing naval abilities. It should also be considered that Iran's naval training has a role in showcasing; however, they don't necessarily express Iran's true abilities or intentions. In spite of the above, Iran is dedicated to strengthening its naval capabilities in the coming years.

Conclusion

Regardless of the nuclear deal, Iran is convinced of its strategic choices to increase deterrence through the military nuclear program. The Iranian deterrence perception relies on a wide array of various missiles, and Iranian arsenal in the hands of Hezbollah and other Shiite militias which serve as an important layer of asymmetric ability. UAVs are the second component of the asymmetric capability. The war in Ukraine illustrated to Iran that there can be no deterrence without missiles. Judging by unofficial statements of senior Iranian officers, the main lesson from this war is that Iran cannot let go of its nuclear deterrence. Such statements prove that the Iranian nuclear program is in fact a military program. The Iranian navy supports the overall strategy and integrates into the asymmetric perception.

Iran doesn't have a written doctrine or a composed strategy, but statements of its leaders express plainly general principles of actions that the Iranian regime might take. The revolutionary nature of the Iranian regime forces it into a confrontation with the USA and Israel. This makes Iran seem radical and aggressive, in addition to its ambitions in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East; however, Iran's leader is well aware of his nation's various limitations and constraints, whether it be from within or in the international arena. Navigating between two contradicting trends requires, on one hand, credible behavior regarding the confrontation with Israel, and support for Middle Eastern terrorist groups, and on the other hand, trying to avoid immediate escalation.

In light of these principles, the lack of a nuclear agreement or the chance of reaching a new one would not change Iran's behavior. Iran will continue its policy, and in the process devote resources to expanding its naval strength.

³¹ Jared Szuba, "[Iran's IRGC Navy harassed US ships in Strait of Hormuz, US says](#)", *Al-Monitor*, December 6, 2022.

³² Shlomo Guetta and Motti Elharar, "[The Development of the Iranian Naval Branch in Recent Years and the Implications for Israel and the Middle Eastern Countries](#)", in Shaul Chorev and Ziv Rubinovitz (eds.), *Maritime Strategic Evaluation for Israel 2021/22* (Haifa: Maritime Policy and Strategy Research Center, University of Haifa, 2022), pp. 139–163.

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