



# Proceedings of the First Postgraduate Webinar Collaboration

University of Haifa  
&  
University of the Free State  
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(Editors)

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## EDITOR'S PREFACE

Towards the end of 2020, a year that launched everyone out of the usual and into the unknown and unexpected with the outbreak of COVID-19, we were approached by senior members of our respective University communities with the idea of hosting a webinar, exclusively for postgraduate students.

Upon meeting via Zoom, it was decided by the organising committee, who also happen to be the editors of this document, that the event be a gathering of postgraduate students, in a closed setting to create a comfortable environment in order to promote fruitful interaction between participants. Given the restrictions of the COVID era, the meeting would be held online via Zoom. The aim of this webinar was to bring together young academics from both Israel and South Africa, in order to discuss topics related to their MA or PhD theses, as well as to facilitate open dialogue and create opportunities for future cooperation.

On the 21<sup>st</sup> of January 2021, six postgraduate students from the University of Haifa and the University of the Free State met each other virtually, and held a fruitful webinar where a wide range of research topics were presented, and ideas were shared. This ranged from terrorism and drugs, to liberal democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa, organised crime and political elites in Sub-Saharan Africa, to a study on Saudi Arabia's foreign policy and a study on China's maritime activities around the Horn of Africa. This wide range of topics, exposed participants to their peers' ideas and areas of research and led to valuable discussions.

Through this initiative, the relationship between the two Universities were also strengthened, and hopes of organising annual postgraduate webinars were raised with a view to organising an in person postgraduate conference. This webinar was the first of its kind held between these Universities, and facilitated and created new bonds, which will be continued by the next group of postgraduate scholars from these institutions.

This webinar not only created an opportunity to share knowledge and facilitate conversations, but created new relationships between postgraduate students, during a time when the opportunity to do so is very scarce.

This volume is a collection of academic works on which the proceedings of the conference were based.

We would like to thank Prof. Shaul Chorev for his support, Mrs. Shachar Gal for her technological assistance, and especially to Dr. Glen Segell and Prof. Hussein Solomon, whose input and guidance to the organising committee was invaluable for the realisation of the successful event.

It is our hope that this may be the first of many successful postgraduate collaboration events, either online or in person. May the successors of this event meet one day, to discuss ideas and share knowledge over conference coffee and pastries.

Tim Jenkins (Haifa, Israel)

René de Klerk (Bloemfontein, South Africa)

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18 March 2021

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## OPENING REMARKS

### **Prof. Hussein Solomon**

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9,621 kilometres separate Bloemfontein from Haifa. Despite the distance, despite the fact that we hail from different faiths, cultures and despite widely divergent contexts, our two universities saw it appropriate to sign a Framework for Academic Collaboration in the pursuit of academic excellence.

Free State and Haifa Universities share common organizational structures. In an effort to improve access to tertiary education, Haifa has established itself as Israel's first "multiversity". In attempting to provide equitable access to post-school education, the University of the Free State's 127 academic departments are spread across three university campuses and 41 teaching locations. Both universities see education as a catalyst for economic development and improvement in the lives of ordinary people in the regions they are located in, as well as nationally. As such community-centred engagement lies at the foundation of both institutions' vision. This is also evinced in the interface between research and social responsibility at both institutions.

Both the Universities of the Free State and Haifa understand the value of pluralism and inclusivity. This is seen in the diverse student and staff profiles at our respective institutions. For the University of the Free State, given our country's divided past, these principles of diversity and inclusivity are especially important. This diversity is seen in our 41,675 students and our 2581 permanent staff members. What has attracted us to the University of Haifa is that your 18,000 students include Jews, Arabs, Druze, Haredi and secular students.

Innovative research is also what drives both institutions. Haifa's six faculties, 56 departments, 8 schools and 69 research centres have pioneered path-breaking research in areas as diverse as public health, neurosciences and security studies. The University of the Free State has, in its 117-year history, also striven for research excellence in fields as diverse as mathematics and agricultural science to economics and politics. This is evident in the fact that it has 188 National Research Foundation (NRF)-rated scholars amongst its staff. The University of the Free State recognizes the integrated nature of the world we inhabit and that partnership amongst global academic partners is key to learning from each

other and advancing academic excellence. Of the university's 2357 publications between 2015 and 2019, 1660 were co-authored with authors emanating from collaborating institutions. We seek such a partnership with the University of Haifa. Indeed, this has already begun with a publication on the Middle East, following a highly successful webinar last year.

Today's webinar continues to entrench the collaboration between our two institutions. What is important is that this webinar is not between existing academics at our respective universities but rather our postgraduate students. In engaging in this webinar, both Free State and Haifa are making an investment in our future academics as well as an investment in our collaboration. For the students, this I am sure, would provide you with valuable experience and insights as you embark on your academic journey and grow your own networks. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate these postgraduate students for demonstrating initiative, scholarship and hard work. Finally, allow me to thank Dr. Glen Segell of Haifa's Ezri Centre for his tireless enthusiasm in supporting this partnership between our respective universities. Mazel Tov to all!

# EXPLORING THE INTERFACE BETWEEN TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME AND POLITICAL ELITES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA: THE CASES OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**Mr. Pholla Samkezi Mbalane**

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## Abstract

Transnational organized crime (TOC) syndicates remain increasingly interconnected across the African continent, and specifically in the Southern Africa region. Operating in the shadow of the economy, criminal syndicates and political elites alike continue to profit from crime. The study unpacks the nature of transnational organized crime in Southern Africa by exploring the interface between organized crime and political elites in the region. This study aims to look at how organized criminal networks have colluded with and/or penetrated state structures and why there are such high levels of state complicity in illegal markets within the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The research also demonstrates the relationship between transnational organized crime, good governance, development, and democracy.

## Glossary of Acronyms

ACTSA – Action for Southern Africa

BDF – Botswana Defence Force

DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo

FRELIMO – *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*

OC – Organized Crime

RENAMO – *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana*

RSA – Republic of South Africa

SADC – Southern African Development Community

SARPPCO – Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-Operation Organisation

SDGs – Sustainable Development Goals

TOC – Transnational Organized Crime

UNTOC – United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime

ZANU-PF – Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front



Transnational organized crime in the Southern Africa region is growing at an alarming rate, and this has sparked international concern. Prominent criminal organizations and professional criminals continue to target the region because of the significant illicit wealth that can be generated.<sup>1</sup> The phenomenon of TOC in the SADC is nothing new, it has been a feature of the statehood in the region before, and since decolonization.<sup>2</sup> However, its scope, scale, and impacts have now grown at unprecedented levels.<sup>3</sup> This is because the web through which global illicit flows and organized crime (OC) operate is neither monolithic nor homogeneous but complex and multi-dimensional, with several actors serving as key facilitators.

### **Delineating the parameters of TOC for this study**

The phenomenon of transnational organized crime remains understudied in the SADC region. Although the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) of 2003, known as the Palermo Convention, provides a reference point for identifying organized crime, consensus on what constitutes TOC remains elusive in the region, as it does globally. Article 2 of the Palermo Convention defines organized crime as follows:

“Organized criminal group shall mean a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offenses, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial and material benefit”.<sup>4</sup>

The above definition is problematic as it defines an organized criminal group and criminalizes participation in such a group but does not offer a definition of what organized crime constitutes. The SADC region relies on this working definition of the Palermo Convention, which is in itself problematic. The Legal Sub-Committee of the Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-Operation Organisation (SARPPCO) presented a definition of organized crime for the Southern African region at its 14<sup>th</sup> Annual General Meeting in 2010 that was adopted by the regional chiefs of police. In its presentation, the committee explicitly stated that

- 1 INTERPOL, (2018). Overview of serious and organized crime in the Southern African Region.
- 2 Hübschle, A. (2010). Organized Crime in Southern Africa: First Annual Review. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.
- 3 The Global Initiative, (2014). Organized Crime in Southern Africa.
- 4 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2004). United Nations Against Transnational Organized Crime and the Protocols Thereto. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

*“the same working definition provided by the Palermo Convention will be employed”.*<sup>5</sup> Thus, the described definition of organised crime is as follows:

“It is committed by two or more perpetrators, who are aware of each other’s existence and general role, and who are acting in concert. It is serious. It is committed repeatedly, and the crimes are committed by the pursuit of material and financial gain”.

While both above definitions are legally binding on SADC member states, this study argues that both have some definitional issues especially within the context of Southern Africa. First, they treat organized crime as being synonymous to a mafia-type hierarchical criminal organization that exists outside of the formal economy,<sup>6</sup> and secondly, they create a depiction that there exists a strict separation between the state and crime,<sup>7</sup> thereby making organized crime an issue of the “bad” versus “good” guys. Within the context of Southern Africa, such definitional issues can be politically convenient in some countries especially where elements within some regimes are extensively involved in organized criminal activities. In other words, these definitional issues become a cop-out from taking action. Hence, this study argues that any preoccupation with the assumptions that organized criminal networks only constitute of individuals or groups of individuals from the clandestine world and the “state versus crime” narrative are problematic and misleading. This is because such assumptions ignore, and to a certain extent omit, the critical role, involvement, and complicity of government officials, law enforcement agencies, and business elites with organized criminal networks in facilitating illicit market operations. As a result, this study proposes and adopts the following definition for TOC in Southern Africa:

“Transnational organised crime is defined as a form of criminal acts that are conducted within and beyond borders of the state by a group of criminals acting in concert with law enforcement agencies and political elites to obtain, directly

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- 5 Hübschle, A. (2013). Of bogus hunters, queenpins and mules: the varied roles of women in transnational organized crime in Southern Africa. *Trends in Organized Crime* 17, 31–51.
  - 6 Hübschle, A. (2011). From theory to practice: Exploring the organized crime-terror nexus in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Perspectives on Terrorism* 5(3–4), 81.
  - 7 Wannenberg, G., & Irish-Qhobosheane, J. (2007). Threats to stability: an overview of some of the issues affecting organized crime in South Africa. In J Irish-Qhobosheane (Ed.), *Gentlemen or villains, thugs or heroes? The social economy of organized crime in South Africa* (South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannesburg) (pp. 179–210)

or indirectly, a financial or material benefit from a set of activities that are illicit or licit”.

## **The extent of organized crime in SADC: Painting a picture of the situation**

The Southern African region is experiencing an increase in transnational organized criminal activities with devastating impacts on national and international security. The region is one of the leading regions for the trade and consumption of heroin with the Republic of South Africa (RSA) classified as the largest heroin destination and consumer base country in Africa.<sup>8</sup> Mauritius is ranked number one in the synthetic drug trade in Southern Africa and among the top ten on the African continent.<sup>9</sup> Human trafficking is on the rise in SADC member states and men, women, and children are bought and sold as commodities and exploited for a range of purposes, including labour and sexual exploitation. The region is also home to two countries, Seychelles and Mauritius, which serve as tax havens and secrecy jurisdictions exposing the entire region to illicit financial flows.<sup>10</sup> As a result, Action for Southern Africa (ACTSA) shows that the region lost USD 8.8 billion on trade-related illicit outflows in 2015 alone.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the significant illicit wealth that could be generated from natural and mineral resources attracts prominent criminal organizations and professional criminals, fuelling the smuggling of mineral resources, wildlife, and rare resources and livestock theft. All the aforementioned typologies are facilitated and enabled by various factors, called enablers, that include cybercrime, porous borders, limited policing capabilities, corruption, trade in small arms and light weapons, and violence, converging with each other in complex ways. To evaluate and juxtapose transnational organized crime and political elites in Southern Africa, this paper adopts William Reno’s shadow state theory.

8 Haysom, S. (2020). Drug Trafficking: From the maskani to the mayor: The political economy of heroin markets in East and Southern Africa.

9 Chelin, R. (2020, 23 September). Breaking Bans: The scourge of synthetic drugs in Mauritius. ENACT Africa.

10 Bagree, S. (2019). ACTSA Briefing Paper: The Money Drain: How Trade Mis-invoicing and Unjust Debt Undermine Economic and Social Rights in Southern Africa. Action for Southern Africa.

11 Ibid.

## The shadow state theory

The paper is informed by the concept of a shadow state — a phenomenon present in various parts of post-colonial Africa. Reno (1995)<sup>12</sup> establishes a concept of a shadow state to describe a parallel system of governance that is constructed behind the façade of laws and government institutions. From this framework, organized crime follows the structure of the war economy, in which various informal structures are established by the shadow state to create systems of profit, power, and protection. A shadow state consists of few individuals in higher echelons of power, including politicians and non-state business elites, who possess considerable influence in shaping policies.<sup>13</sup> As a result, political elites and criminals become rulers of the shadow state with the ability to manipulate access to both the formal and clandestine markets, thereby undermining the legal institutions of government. In this way, these actors collude and are, therefore, able to strategically enhance their power and enrich themselves.<sup>14</sup>

Furthermore, rulers of the shadow state also deliberately weaken institutional structures of the formal government either by paying too little attention to the needs of the population<sup>15</sup> and/or through the manipulation of the key institutions of government. Such deliberate actions and interactions create an ideal system for collusive and corruptive economic and political behaviour, rendering the formal state fragile while the shadow state flourishes. To generate funds for the shadow state, state and non-state actors establish a shadow economy that includes a broad range of informal economic relationships and activities that do not fall within the state-regulated frameworks. Mafias, criminals, drug-traffickers, political and business elites, “downstream” actors, such as truck drivers and poppy farmers, who are involved in the smuggling of high-value commodities, mass extraction of natural resources, currency order, and exchange system (Hawalla) and aid manipulation, are all actors involved in this economy operating parallel to, and sometimes overlapping, merging with, and distorting the formal economy of a

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12 Reno, W. (1995). *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

13 Hussein, H. (2018). Tomatoes, tribes, bananas, and businessmen: An analysis of the shadow state and the politics of water in Jordan. *Environmental Science & Policy*, 84.

14 Funke, N. & Solomon, H. (2002). *The Shadow State in Africa: A Discussion*, DPMF Occasional Paper, No 5. Addis Ababa: Development Policy Management Forum.

15 Ibid.

country.<sup>16</sup> The establishment of such parallel systems (both shadow state and shadow economy) create a fertile environment for the collusion of criminals and political elites who continue to profit from crime, consequently creating a nexus between crime and politics that blurs the line that separates the illicit from licit.

### **The criminal-political nexus in the SADC region**

The criminal-political nexus refers to the cases where criminal networks and political elites co-exist and the distinction between illicit and licit is blurred. This is evident in Southern Africa where states and organized crime are inextricably linked and state institutions tolerate and exploit criminal.<sup>17</sup> In light of the typologies and enablers of organized crime listed in the earlier paragraph, it is apparent that a wide variety of illicit activities are present in the region. Criminal activities vary on a spectrum from purely private to state legitimated activities. An example of the latter — the focus of this study — would be the involvement of political, military, and police elites in Zimbabwe’s Marange diamonds fields. The Marange diamonds are reputed to be the richest diamond mines worldwide with an estimated value of up to USD 800 billion and a potential source of wealth for the next 80 years.<sup>18</sup> Between March 2008 and March 2009, Zimbabwe was without an official government and this state of anarchy provided an opportunity for the creation of a shadow economy.<sup>19</sup> Political, military, and police officials became key actors in this informal economy, using their access to authority as a tool for access to diamonds and aggrandizement.

Consequently, the Marange diamond fields became heavily militarized, culminating in over 200 deaths of locals through the “Hakudzokwe kumunda” (meaning “you will not return”) operation.<sup>20</sup> Therefore, violence, which is one of the features critical in creating and maintaining a shadow economy, was used by

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16 Ballentine, K. & Nietzsche, H. (2005). The Political Economy of Civil War and Conflict Transformation. In M. Fischer & B. Schmelzle (Eds.), *Transforming War Economies: Dilemmas and Strategies* (pp. 11–33).

17 Blum, C. (2016). *Transnational Organized Crime in Southern Africa and Mozambique*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

18 Nichols, J.E. (2012). A conflict of diamonds: The Kimberley process and Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields. *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 40(4), 648-685.

19 Ntlhakana, A. (2014). Conflict Diamonds in Zimbabwe: Actors, Issues and Implications, *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* 3(1), 61–76.

20 Nyota, A. & Sibanda, F. (2012). Digging for Diamonds, Wielding New Words: A Linguistic Perspective on Zimbabwe’s “Blood Diamonds”. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 38(1).

state security forces who were heavily involved in smuggling diamonds to secure their movement over the country's borders. Notably, proceeds from these illegal activities were then used as a mainstay of the patronage system that ensured that the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), remained in power for 37 years under the late former president Mugabe.<sup>21</sup> This example shows the creation and presence of shadow economies in the region and the predatory nature of the post-colonial African state where the state is used as an apparatus to generate incentives for leaders to benefit from the resources of their own countries.

The predatory management of natural resources is not only limited to Zimbabwe but also common in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where insurgents and elements of government forces control about 65 per cent of the country's gold mines that are the foundation of an international smuggling network worth an estimated USD 400 million annually.<sup>22</sup> While Reno states that the shadow state constitutes of politicians and business elites who act in secretive ways to generate profits from crime, a report released by the Global Witness (2016)<sup>23</sup> revealed that La Générale des Carrières et des Mines (Gécamines), a state-owned mining company, signed away USD 880 million worth of royalties to an offshore company linked to Dan Gertler, former President Joseph Kabila's close friend, in secret. This secretive deal was facilitated by corruption, with Gertler found to have paid over USD 100 million in bribes to DRC officials including Kabila, in exchange for access to some of the nation's best natural resources.<sup>24</sup>

Indeed, organized criminal activities in the region, as in many parts of Africa, are often associated with a set of relationships involving senior political figures, powerful local intermediaries, and professional criminals.<sup>25</sup> It is nonetheless important to note that the collusion between state and organized crime is

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- 21 Kasipo, M. (2018). Political Transition in Zimbabwe: A New Era for Organized Crime? The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.
  - 22 Enough Project, (2016). Point of Origin — Status Report on the Impact of Dodd-Frank 1502 in Congo. Enough Project.
  - 23 Global Witness, (2016). River of Gold: How the state lost out in an Eastern Congo Gold Boom, while armed groups, a foreign mining company and provincial authorities pocketed millions. Mining.
  - 24 Patterson, S. (2016). Glencore Unit in Congo Made Undisclosed Payments to Businessman Accused of Bribery. The Wall Street Journal.
  - 25 Ellis, S. & Shaw, M. (2015). Does organized crime exist in Africa? *African Affairs* 114(457), 505–528.

complex, diverse, and can take different forms.<sup>26</sup> Hence, there are various ways to conceptualize the nexus between the state and organized crime in Southern Africa.

The SADC region is home to weak or fragile and failed states such as Zimbabwe, the DRC, Angola, Lesotho, and Mozambique, often marked by protracted civil wars and political instability.<sup>27</sup> A weak state has a low capacity and poor performance concerning security and development. While state fragility in Africa is often ascribed to the institutional weaknesses inherited from colonialism, Solomon and Funke (2002)<sup>28</sup> have pointed out that rulers of the shadow state deliberately weaken institutional structures of the state, either by paying too little attention to the needs of the population or through manipulating the critical institutions of the formal government. Therefore, whether deliberate or not, state fragility provides criminal groups with an opportunity to penetrate critical state institutions in order to facilitate their illicit activities. This is because fragile states are marked by, amongst others, high levels of corruption, insecurity, and weak law enforcement. These factors serve as enablers for organized criminal syndicates to conceal their illicit activities with law enforcement agencies' assistance, as seen (in the next paragraphs) with motor vehicle theft, where customs officials become critical in the movement of stolen vehicles across borders.

On the other hand, civil conflicts and political instability prevalent in these weak states result in the proliferation of organized criminal activities. Both these incidents create a state of disorder in the region that is instrumental for the looting and exploitation of natural resources for personal benefit. The Mozambican civil war is an example of how disorder serves as an instrument for the shadow state rulers to loot their country's natural resources. During the civil war, a conflict of 15 years between *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) and *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO) that began in May 1977 and lasted until October 1992,<sup>29</sup> both warring parties engaged in organized crime to meet wartime needs.<sup>30</sup> For example, RENAMO was involved in smuggling timber

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26 Ibid.

27 Fragile States Index, (2020). Measuring Fragility: Risk and Vulnerability in 178 Countries. Fragile States Index.

28 Ibid.

29 Momodu, S., (2018, 4 July). The Mozambican Civil War (1977–1992). BlackPast.org.

30 Ibid.

and other goods to finance its operations.<sup>31</sup> The state of disorder during the civil war provided warring parties with an opportunity to loot Mozambique's natural resources and bolstered the establishment of organized crime. At the end of the civil conflict, FRELIMO, the ruling party, consolidated the patronage systems, which were established during the era of institutionalized rule, to maintain its dominance over the multi-party system. To date, there are persistent indications of the usage of illicit monies to bankroll political contestation.

Moreover, indications of a political dynasty, commonly known as state capture, are common in the SADC region and point to the interlocking of organized crime and politics. Political dynasty or state capture, according to Sutch,<sup>32</sup> can be defined as the actions of individuals or groups both in public and private sectors influencing the formations of laws, regulations, decrees, and other government policies to their advantage. In other words, an individual or groups of individuals gain informal control over the arms of government. This phenomenon has been witnessed in South African politics, where members of the former president's family, Jacob Zuma, and the Guptas, went to great lengths to influence the South African state. Members of the Gupta family directly instructed public officials from various state bodies to make decisions that advance their business interests.<sup>33</sup> As a result, they enjoyed lucrative contracts with South African government departments and state-owned conglomerates — all under the protection of Jacob Zuma.<sup>34</sup>

Evidently, corrupt politicians and state officials, often complicit with criminal syndicates, are involved in lucrative illicit markets in countries across the region and operate with high impunity to generate considerable profits. The Zambian President Edgar Lungu and other government officials have been, for years, accused of facilitating rosewood trafficking into China's booming furniture industry — an illegal trade that generated around USD 7.5 million in bribes annually.<sup>35</sup> In Botswana, commissioned and non-commissioned members

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31 Haysom, S. (2018). *Where Crime Compounds Conflict: Understanding Northern Mozambique's Vulnerabilities*. Global Initiative.

32 Martin, E. M. & Solomon, H. (2016). Understanding the Phenomenon of "State Capture" in South Africa. *Southern African Peace and Security Studies* 5(1), 21–34.

33 Arun, N. (2019). State capture: Zuma, the Guptas, and the sale of South Africa. BBC News.

34 Chipkin, I. & Swilling, M. (2018). *Shadow State: The Politics of State Capture*. South Africa: Wits University Press.

35 News24, (2019, 6 December). Zambian president allegedly involved in illegal timber trade: report. News24.



along with junior officers of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) are involved in the illicit ivory trade (an ivory trophy is said to fetch around USD 200 000) and transport ivory to South Africa through ungazetted points or Ramoswa or Platjaan borders using government vehicles to evade other law enforcers and checkpoints.<sup>36</sup> Constable Matome Mafa and some Home Affairs officials were arrested for arranging fraudulent documents for stolen vehicles to pass through Groblersbrug port of entry into Botswana without being subjected to mandatory examination in return for kickbacks.<sup>37</sup> These are just a few of the examples that show the extent to which state officials have not only become complicit in organized criminal activities, but also spend much of their energy engaged in transactions that they themselves have labelled as illicit.

The above brief discussion shows the connection between organized crime and politics in the Southern Africa region. Some public sector members work with some private sector members and criminal syndicates to generate incentives through illicit activities, thereby blurring the lines that separate crime and politics and the legal and illegal.

### **Impacts of TOC on good governance, development, and democracy**

Transnational organized crime has dire implications on sustainable development, good governance, and democracy. ENACT (2020)<sup>38</sup> argues that organized crime affects each of the five core priorities of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) agenda: people, planet, prosperity, peace, and partnership. The consequences of organized crime are severe and threaten every aspect of sustainable development. Organized crime robs nations of revenue that could have funded sustainable development and the eradication of poverty, as the valuable resources lost to criminal gangs could have been used to build schools, hospitals, roads, and a future for the citizenry. This is especially true in Southern Africa, where the most vulnerable continue to endure the unbearable consequences of organized crime while political elites and criminal syndicates profit.

36 Mmeso, P. (2017). Soldiers in illegal ivory trade. *The Patriot*.

37 Matlala, A. (2020, 17 March). Constable gets 7 years in jail for smuggling stolen vehicles. *The Citizen*..

38 ENACT, (2020). Organized crime in Africa: How does organized crime threaten development? ENACT Africa.

According to the World Bank (2011),<sup>39</sup> organized crime and conflict have the same detrimental effects on equitable and sustainable economic development and contribute to a development underperformance of 80 per cent, resulting in the sustainable economic development of only around 20 per cent annually. Transnational organized crime undermines democratic rule by eroding sovereignty, eluding the notion of territorial control and national sovereignty, distorting the line between legal and illegal, hampering the formulation of public policy, and severely affecting social cohesion. It also undermines good governance in the sense that it leads to an extreme centralization of political power, unfair and unequal distribution of resources and opportunities, and poor political decisions.

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# LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FACTORS WITH APPLICATION TO SENEGAL, MAURITIUS AND BOTSWANA

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## Abstract

Liberal democracy is a highly debated and contested form of governance, not just in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), but in the world. It has however, faced many challenges and has been contested by other forms of governance and even distorted forms of democracy that has been called liberal democracy. The negativity surrounding liberal democracy and SSA has been ongoing for decades, in some cases since the independence era. When liberal democracy is thoroughly defined and broken down into its composing elements, it is evident that there are some aspects of liberal democracy that is strong and established in SSA. This study thus seeks to uncover aspects of liberal democracy that has taken root and has established itself firmly in the countries of Senegal, Mauritius and Botswana, in an attempt to establish what these factors look like in these so-called “African liberal democracies”, and what lessons can be learned from these countries.

## Glossary of Acronyms

AU – African Union

APRM – African Peer Review Mechanism

SSA – Sub-Saharan African

V-Dem – Varieties of Democracy

For the past three decades, liberal democracy has been the foundation of modern societies’ governance, so much so that in 1983, it was declared to be the world’s “*new universal religion*”.<sup>1</sup> This statement was emphasised by the large number of liberal democratic reforms across the world, which accelerated after the Cold War, constituting the ‘third wave of democracy’.<sup>2</sup> The lasting impact of

1 Corcoran, P. (1983). *The Limits of Democratic Theory*. In G. Duncan, *Democratic Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

2 Huntington, S. (1991). *Democracy's Third Wave*. *Journal of Democracy*, 12–34.

Huntington's so-called third wave of democracy on African states is historically and continuously ambivalent, especially considering the number of African states that have in recent history existed, or continue to exist, under dictatorial, authoritarian-type regimes.<sup>3</sup> Regardless, there have been attempts to promote and develop democracy in the region. The African Union (AU), has implemented, for example, the Constitutive Act in 2001 which, amongst other things, aims to direct African leaders of AU member countries to promote, protect, and sustain liberal democratic ideals like human rights, good governance, and the rule of law.<sup>4</sup> The AU's Constitutive Act along with the APRM, or African Peer Review Mechanism, are part of the AU's attempt to promote and establish good governance across the continent. However, these mechanisms have not improved the pessimism about the likelihood of liberal democracy in Africa.

A 2016 article, authored by Prince Mashele, painted a bleak picture for liberal democracy in Africa. Mashele stated that true Africans, who live by African values and have not been corrupted by Western concepts, will never adapt to or adopt particular liberal democratic concepts like a constitution, Western education that promotes equality and human rights, or even accountability of government.<sup>5</sup> Mashele declared that in true African states people have no expectations for moral governance; ordinary citizens know that "*those who have power have it for themselves and their friends and families*".<sup>6</sup> Mashele stated that it is time for Africans to accept that Africa will never look like the West with its liberal democratic governance, implying that liberal democracy is a system of governance that is incompatible with Africa.

In 1997's, 'The Rise of Illiberal Democracy', Fareed Zakaria conceptualised liberal democracy in two separate parts.<sup>7</sup> Zakaria conceptualised liberal democracy as being composed of democracy, or the rule of the people as determined through free and fair frequent elections, and the aspect of liberal constitutionalism, which is the protection of basic human freedoms, the rule of law and separation of powers.<sup>8</sup> Zakaria raised his concern with the increased existence of illiberal

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3 Selassie, B. (2011). Democracy and Peace in the Age of Globalization: Old Problems, New Challenges for Africa. *African Studies Review*, 19–31.

4 Ibid.

5 Mashele, P. (2016, December 22). South Africa is Just Another African Country - Tell the Clever Blacks.

6 Ibid.

7 Zakaria, F. (1997). The Rise of Illiberal Democracies. *Foreign Affairs*, 22-43.

8 Ibid.

democratic states — countries that hold regular democratic elections but whose governments fail to uphold the liberal constitutionalism aspect of liberal democracy.<sup>9</sup> In other words, these are countries that have democratically elected regimes but who deprive citizens of “*basic rights and freedoms*” — therefore becoming illiberal democracies.<sup>10</sup>

Considering that the “world religion” of liberal democracy is largely being threatened and diminishing throughout the world and in Africa (refer to the recent events in the United States, Ghana and Uganda), it is necessary to analyse factors that affect liberal democracy in order to determine whether there is a future for this system of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Given the conceptualisation of liberal democracy that explains the concept in terms of the electoral as well as the constitutional liberalism aspect, this study focuses on analysing the constitutional liberalism aspect of liberal democracy. The question that is investigated in this study is the extent to which liberal democracy, specifically the constitutional liberalism aspect as it has predominantly developed in the West, is present in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since constitutional liberalism is one of the two core pillars of liberal democracy, the investigation of liberal democracy through the analysis of various social and political factors which form part of constitutional liberalism constitute a part of the research question. In order to determine whether liberal democracy is a system of governance that is present in Sub-Saharan Africa, various social and political issues pertaining to and affecting liberal democracy in the region are discussed. The social factors of analysis consist of the existence of a middle class, levels and quality of education, as well as the presence of ethnic tension and division. The political factors used in this study include an analysis of the authoritarian regimes and tendencies of authoritarian rule on the continent, civic response to these authoritarian tendencies, as well as an analysis of political will and the rise of populism and populist trends across the continent.

The above-mentioned social and political factors are applied to Senegal, Botswana, and Mauritius in order to evaluate how and whether liberal democracy is present through the constitutional liberalism pillar. These three countries represent the extensive diversity which is found in Sub-Saharan Africa, and will thus present a more specific and contextual analysis of liberal democracy.

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9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.



Liberal democracy is a concept that is complex and multifaceted, posing many challenges in defining the concept, and encompasses all aspects of governance and how governance is conducted. Hence, this study attempted to find correlating factors and similarities in terms of various social and political aspects of three Sub-Saharan countries that have been successful in implementing and establishing liberal democratic governance. Some of the main theoretical findings that make up a liberal democratic government include the influential conceptualisation by Zakaria (1997) and the two pillars of liberal democracy, namely elections, and constitutional liberalism. This includes the protection of liberal rights and freedoms, and specifically places emphasis on the importance of the rule of law to prevent a democracy from becoming a despotic regime.<sup>11</sup> De Jager and Sedbudubudu's central liberal democratic elements are those of individual freedoms, an active and independent civil society, and the rule of law that presupposes the protection of civil rights and limited political power.<sup>12</sup> Fundamentally then, a liberal democracy can be stated to be composed of two main elements. First, it is a system of governance that provides citizens with the opportunity to participate in the political process through competitive, multiparty, free, fair, and regularly held elections where every citizen has the right to participate. Secondly, through the rule of law and constitutionalism, it provides the protection and provision of liberal rights and freedoms to all people, including minorities, without creating divisions or inequalities in society and ensuring that all people have consistent access to basic rights like healthcare, shelter, food, and clean water. Liberal democracy thus requires the complete interrelationship between these two aspects of democracy.

By identifying specific aspects of governance that are integral to liberal democracy, correlating factors with regards to these aspects could be identified between Senegal, Mauritius, and Botswana, three SSA countries that are considered to be successful and established in their liberal democratic governance. By analysing the extent of liberal democracy in these cases, a conclusion on the future of liberal democracy and whether there is hope for it in the region, can also be anticipated.

One of the first correlating factors identified between the three cases is that the post-independence leaders were strong leaders, committed to creating stability

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11 Rhoden, T. (2015). The Liberal in Liberal Democracy. *Democratization*, 560–578.

12 de Jager, N., & Sedbudubudu's, D. (2017). Towards Understanding Botswana and South Africa's Ambivalence to Liberal Democracy. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 15–33.

and a peaceful transition to independence, and is briefly discussed in each case study. The implementation of these stable, peaceful transitions occurred in different ways, with Senegal for example first establishing a sort of *de facto* one-party state under President Senghor, although this was changed in response to civil protest and citizens' demand for a more competitive, open political system. Thus, the post-independence foundation that was established in all three cases was one of stability, with an absence of large-scale conflict or tension. In their different historical contexts and colonial experiences, it is evident that the political leaders who took over upon independence possessed a level of political will and commitment to peaceful and good governance. Instead, the leaders of Senegal, Botswana, and Mauritius focused on establishing stability and inclusive political systems that was largely achieved, albeit through different approaches.

With regards to political culture, although there are differences in the sub-elements analysed within political culture, the overall political culture in these countries create an environment that is conducive to liberal democracy. In all three cases, there is a sense of the social contract existing between citizens and government, with the majority of individuals aware of their individual rights and liberties, but also willing to give up some of these individual freedoms in cases of the country's greater good. The indication of the social contract being present in these countries is fundamental to the liberalism aspect of liberal democracy that sees the social contract as one of the most fundamental agreements between citizens and governments.

A basic requirement of liberal democracy, namely that of democratic proceduralism through free, fair, open, and regularly held elections is a consistent factor present in the three cases. Not just are the procedures of democratic elections followed, but it is also the majority's preferred way of electing their political leaders across the three cases. The majority of citizens in Senegal, Botswana, and Mauritius express that they have a majority demand for free, regular, and fair elections in which they can participate in the governance process and the election of their political leaders. Additionally, all three countries are seemingly committed to providing their citizens with democratic elections, with regular elections taking place in every country and achieving good scores on various indicators on the elections' free, fair and openness.

This relates to Zakaria's first pillar of liberal democracy — that of democracy itself. Simply put, there is both supply and demand for liberal democratic elections. The three cases also established competitive, multiparty political systems, thus incorporating political competition and political pluralism — elements stated to

be fundamental in liberal democracy.<sup>13</sup> Jotia (2012) states that political leaders elected in the context of political pluralism is an inherent requirement of liberal democracies. The establishment and presence of the democracy aspect of liberal democracy then leads to the question of how many additional correlating factors there are, especially in terms of how democracy is interrelated and intertwined with the guarantee of liberal rights and freedoms that is essentially determined and protected by the rule of law.

A fundamentally important aspect of liberal democracy is the respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism. This study found that, in all three case studies, there is a high level of and majority demand for the rule of law, and a general sense that everyone, including political leaders, should be held responsible and treated equally before the law. People across the three countries therefore respect their laws and constitutions, and have an expectation of equal treatment and application of the law. This relates to Zakaria's pillar of constitutional liberalism and the primacy of the rule of law and constitution in any country attempting to establish a liberal democracy. It is this demand and respect for the rule of law that ultimately prevents despotism from taking root, which is an essential part of a liberal democratic regime.

Another common element identified between the three cases is the high ratings of the protection and provision of civil and political freedoms, inherently required by liberal democratic governance. These ratings and indicators are from various databases, including V-Dem, Freedom House and the Ibrahim Index for African Governance. Only Freedom House cites that Senegal does not, according to their methodology, qualify as a liberal democracy, and is only considered to be "Partly Free". Despite the Freedom House ratings of Senegal, the V-Dem indicators on Senegal's civil and political liberties indicate a high score for both of these,<sup>14</sup> at 0.84 and 0.91, respectively.<sup>15</sup> Additionally, these indicators for Botswana are 0.88 for civil liberties and 0.84 for political liberties, and 0.89 and 0.91 for civil and political liberties in Mauritius.<sup>16</sup> There is evidently a high level of protection and promotion of civil and political liberties in all of these cases. This indicates another similarity between the cases.

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13 Jotia, A. (2012). Liberal Democracy: An African Perspective. *Academic Research International*, 621-628.

14 Out of a high score of 1, indicating perfect performance in the provision of political/civil rights.

15 Coppedge, M. G. (2020). V-Dem Botswana-2019. Retrieved from *Varieties of Democracy*.

16 Ibid.

With regards to the middle class and the existence of a robust middle class, very few common elements that are conducive to liberal democracy are observed. The three cases have very different contexts with regards to their middle classes and the relating sub-factors. This ranges from Mauritius, being considered an upper-middle income country with low levels of inequality, to Botswana, which has very high levels of inequality, and Senegal, with a very high percentage of individuals living in multidimensional poverty that cannot be classified as being part of an established middle class. The Lived Poverty Index and Multidimensional Poverty Index, along with assessing disposable income and access to basic necessities, indicates that there are no clear similarities across these three cases — thus, in terms of the middle class, there are generally no similarities relating to positive, conducive factors across the three cases on liberal democracy. Each case has a very different economic context and thus a varied established middle-class size that is also being impacted by COVID-19 and its global economic effects that will still need to be determined in the months, and even years, post-COVID-19.

With the growth of the middle class, it is argued that more rights and liberties aligning with liberal democracy will be demanded by citizens. However, given the high numbers of individuals in vulnerable employment and inconsistency across the cases in terms of citizens' ability to purchase consumer items with disposable income or have reliable and regular access to basic necessities, this is not a factor that can be argued to have an impact on the establishment of liberal democracy across these cases. The argument that countries with small middle classes become vulnerable to poor accountability, a lack of protection of civil liberties, as well as deficient law and order is therefore questioned in this study.<sup>17</sup> Despite the small established middle classes in Senegal and Botswana, the rule of law and the respect for constitutional rule has remained and is a majority demand by citizens, with both of these countries achieving high ratings with regards to respect for both civil and political liberties. The factor of the middle class further then relates to that of education that, along with a robust and established middle class, is one of the most basic factors that will drive the demand for liberal democracy.<sup>18</sup>

17 Resnick, D. (2015). The Middle Class and Democratic Consolidation in Zambia. *Journal of International Development*, 693–715.

18 Huntington, S. (1991). Democracy's Third Wave. *Journal of Democracy*, 12–34; Lipset, S. (1959). Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy. *The American Political Science Review*, 59–105.

The issue of education and its fundamentality to liberal democracy is also not evident across the three case studies. Education levels in each of the studied cases, which is argued to also be one of the main drivers for liberal democracy, especially higher education levels, is not a prominent factor and only a small minority of citizens in each of the cases are found to actually have some level of higher education. However, there is once again no similarity between the three cases, with extremely varied statistics on education enrolment and the quality of education. In all three cases, there is a small minority of citizens who actually have some higher education, supposedly rendering the population vulnerable to extremist tendencies.<sup>19</sup> However, there have been no real extremist politics that has taken root in any of these cases. Liberal democracy has not fallen apart, regardless of the fact that levels and quality of education, vary substantively among these three cases.<sup>20</sup> Additionally, despite the fact that a small minority of citizens across these cases have achieved a level of higher education, democracy and the demand for liberal freedoms remain high — again casting doubt on the primacy of higher education levels and its necessity for liberal democracy, as stated by Imai (2010).<sup>21</sup>

With regards to ethnicity and ethnic conflict and division, there are quite consistent findings, with all three case studies de-emphasising ethnic cleavages in their societies and promoting inclusive societies that do not focus on ethnic differences. This is important not just for the social cohesion and sense of unity needed in liberal democracy, but also serves as evidence that the protection of the rights of all groups, including ethnic minorities, are respected. Additionally, it illustrates that the opportunity for politicisation and mobilisation of voters presented by divisions, like ethnic differences, is not exploited by political leaders. In all three cases in this study, there is an evident rejection of the politicisation of ethnicity by citizens, and it is not accepted as a legitimate political tactic. While there are cases where ethnicity has had the potential to become a point of conflict and tension, like in Senegal's Casamance region, the emphasis of this situation is rather placed on the developmental issues and not the ethnic differences of that region.

Similarly, ethnic tensions in Mauritius that happened in quite recent history in 1999 is not a normal or accepted occurrence, and the shock that it had caused in

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19 Ibid.

20 Imai, K. (2010). Internal Versus External Requisites of Democracy. *International Journal on World Peace*, 49–87.

21 Ibid.

this country prompted and encouraged governments since then to improve the social inclusion of all ethnic groups. Additionally, in Mauritius, the commitment to de-emphasising ethnic differences in society is entrenched in the constitution that does not classify citizens according to their actual ethnicities, but rather according to other criteria. Furthermore, in Botswana's case, ethnicity has been an element of society that has prompted government to improve inclusion and equality among all ethnic groups; social inclusion is thus encouraged and promoted by government. Additionally, in cases where ethnic disputes did arise in Botswana, like the San's dispute about being removed from their traditional land, it was solved by application of the rule of law and the courts — again highlighting the importance of the rule of law in this country. Aside from the rejection of the politicisation of ethnic differences in all three of the included cases, there is a majority perception that all ethnic groups receive equal treatment by government, and not in one case is there a majority perception of one ethnic group being treated unfairly or unjustly by their respective governments. Social cohesion, inclusion, equality, and the avoidance of politicising ethnicity is thus a prominent feature across all three cases. This feature ties in with the respect for minority groups and their respective rights that is a fundamental feature of liberal democracy. This links to Zakaria's element of constitutional liberalism which highlights the provision of basic rights and necessities to all citizens, including minority ethnic groups.

With regards to political will, there is a general sense that all of the regimes have some degree of political will to at least maintain the level of governance that had been in operation upon their government's takeover. While Botswana's governance indicators decreased slightly under former president Ian Khama, President Masisi has affirmed his commitment to liberal democratic rule and institutions, which suggests that he and his government have the political will to improve Botswana's overall governance and improve the overall human development in the country, which also decreased under the previous regime. The other two case studies also have high levels of overall human development; another positive indicator that there is a commitment to at least maintaining the current state of the country's governance. It further suggests that these governments are maintaining the levels of good governance that enables human development and includes the provision of basic rights and liberties.

Additionally, the majority of citizens in Mauritius, Senegal, and Botswana do not perceive a severe decrease in their liberal rights and freedoms or the provision and protection thereof by government; a factor that is a definite commonality

across all three cases. This again indicates that the level of political will found across these three countries' governments have at the very least maintained the level of governance. Overall, there is some political will present to uphold the standards of good governance and liberal democratic governance established in each country. While Senegal has experienced a downgrade to "Partly Free" and is thus not considered a liberal democracy by Freedom House, there are definite positive changes being made, like the improvement in corruption levels that indicates a positive change in governance. Overall then, there is a degree of political will across the three cases to maintain their countries' good governance and liberal democracies.

Another factor that is consistent throughout the case studies is the lack of populist politics and absence of populist rhetoric used in the political spheres. Senegal's primary focus on political ideology and the fact that historically, political parties had to be aligned with a specific political ideology when transitioning to a multiparty, open liberal democracy, created a political tradition in Senegal that focuses more on ideology than any other factor. This has essentially limited the use of populist tactics by politicians to mobilise voters. A similar situation is evident in Mauritius, where it is stated that no "radical tendencies" are present.<sup>22</sup> This suggests that, despite some concerns about populist-type rhetoric used by PM Jugnauth in the run-up to the most recent elections, populism is not an element that is prominently present in Mauritius. However, another concern that has been raised in the Mauritian case is the growing scepticism towards the traditional political parties that increasingly places the country at risk of being susceptible to populist tactics by politicians or other social movements.<sup>23</sup> Botswana is also stated to have no evidence of populist politics or rhetoric, thus establishing the fact that this is a factor that is mostly present across the three case studies. With regards to the lack of populism and how it is conducive to liberal democracy, populism is stated to be directly in opposition to liberal democracy.<sup>24</sup> It is therefore a positive sign that there is no prominent, obvious incidents of populism in these countries, as it would essentially mean that liberal democracy is being explicitly challenged. This also relates to the absence of

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22 Bertelsmann Transformation Index. (2020). 2020 Country Report - Mauritius. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung.

23 Mauritius Times. (2020, September 4). Rule by Populism or Democratic Norms?

24 Galston, W. (2018). The Populist Challenge to Liberal Democracy. *Journal of Democracy*, 5–19.

the politicisation of ethnic differences and similar divisions, often exploited by populists and authoritarian politicians across the Sub-Saharan region.<sup>25</sup>

Another factor of analysis that has been included in this study and has shown similarities across the three case studies is the lack of authoritarian tendencies and authoritarian rule. In the Senegalese case, a political move by former president Wade that was perceived as an attempted power grab was strongly opposed and sparked outrage among Senegalese. The abolishment of the prime minister position by President Sall had prompted criticism as a power grab attempt, however, the strong reaction against former president Wade's attempt to retain political power set the scene, so to speak, for any political moves that might be considered authoritarian. Additionally, the Senegalese constitution provides checks and balances on the executive's power, although reforms to strengthen these checks and balances on the executive are yet to be implemented by President Sall.<sup>26</sup> There is also a degree of separation of powers between the branches of government that is crucial in preventing a strong executive that could attempt authoritarian moves. In the Mauritian context, the handover of the PM position in Mauritius from father to son sparked outrage due to the dynastic, nepotistic tendencies this displayed and indicated an attempt to keep political power a Jugnauth family affair. While there is no outright authoritarianism present in Mauritius, concerns are raised about the lack of true political renewal and the tendency toward dynastic rule, although PM Jugnauth was elected in the 2019 elections in Mauritius. Somewhat differently from Senegal is the fact that there are very strong and established systems of checks and balances on the executive's power, also guaranteed by the Mauritian constitution. The Botswanan context is somewhat different in the sense that each president willingly and voluntarily stepped down from their presidential position before their term as president ended, in order to ensure a smoother transition to the following president or regime. This in itself is an indication that authoritarianism is not very likely to occur in Botswana, since the president steps down well before the end of their term as president. There is thus an inherent respect for the term limits placed on the executive. The respect for the rule of law once again becomes evident through the fact that, while there is no true separation of powers between the branches of government, constitutional provisions that prevent authoritarian

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25 Mudde, C. & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2017). *Populism: A Very Short Introduction*. New York: Oxford University Press.

26 Freedom House. (2020). *Freedom in the World 2020: Senegal*.



tendencies are respected. Generally, then, there is no tolerance or real cases of authoritarian political moves in the case studies.

Another essential component of liberal democracy is an independently functioning civil society and a sphere of movement within society that creates the ability for these movements to safely function, apart from government interference.<sup>27</sup> An autonomous and active civil society that keeps government accountable is thus an important factor to consider and it is a factor that is present in especially Senegal and Mauritius. Given Botswana's general sense of "apoliticism", there is not a very active or vocal civil society.<sup>28</sup> Despite the fact that civil society is not very active and vocal towards government, there is a definite autonomous space for these groups to operate in, without government coercion or interference. Senegal has had instances of active, vocal civil society action against government that go back to 1974 when civil society demanded an open, multiparty system.<sup>29</sup> This was also evident in the attempt of former president Wade to run for president for an unconstitutional third term, clearly indicating that Senegalese civil society will take action against government in cases perceived as authoritarian and going against the liberal democratic traditions. Similarly, Mauritian civil society is extremely vocal and active, as was evident with the recent oil spill and the criticism against government inaction to prevent an environmental disaster. While an active civil society is not clearly present in all three case studies, it is important to note that in two of the cases civil society has an important and active role and in all three cases there are autonomous spaces for these organisations to function without government interference — fundamental to liberal democracy.

As mentioned, each country in the world that is identified as a liberal democracy is in a process of evolution and constant change, and the same is true for Sub-Saharan countries. Each of these countries are still in a process of political evolution — some of these might evolve and change to state forms akin to liberal democracy while others will not, but a blanket statement that there is no hope for responsible, accountable, and liberal democratic governance in the region is overly pessimistic.

27 Held, D. (2006). *Models of Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

28 Good, K. & Taylor, I. (2008). Botswana: A Minimalist Democracy. *Democratization*, 750–765.

29 Vohito-Anyanwu, S. (2020). Promoting Constitutional Democracy: Regulating Political Parties in the Central African Republic and Senegal. *PER/PELJ*, 2–34.

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# SAUDI ARABIA'S FOREIGN POLICY AND OIL: THROUGH MAJOR CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TOWARDS DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL?

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## Abstract

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is world's leading oil producer. It holds around 16 percent of the world's proven petroleum reserves (2015) and ranks as the largest exporter of petroleum (on average 8.3 m bpd in 2019). Furthermore, because of its enormous petroleum reserves and substantial oil production, but relatively small population, the Saudi kingdom has managed to accumulate significant financial reserves over the past fifty years (since late-1960s). However, in the recent years, Saudi Arabia has increasingly faced major challenges, including: the widespread revolutions ("the Arab Spring"), which brought down several governments in the Arab world; the Saudi-Iran rivalry; the compelling domestic economic pressure caused by the thriving population and the diminishing per capita oil income; and the global CoViD-19 pandemic. In light of these regional issues, and because of Saudi Arabia's behind-the-scenes influence on the developing Gulf States-Israel relations, I have decided to discuss the following questions in this brief essay: **How are Saudi oil and foreign policy intertwined, and what are the principles of Saudi foreign policy? What are the major challenges and opportunities concerning Saudi strategic interests? How are these issues linked to the possible establishment of Saudi-Israel diplomatic relations?**

Oil wealth and financial power have been a compelling foreign policy tools for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia during the past fifty years. Because of its increasing population (estimated around 34 million in 2020), and the size of its national economy (Gross Domestic Product (GDP) according to purchasing power parity \$1,775 billion in 2017), and its political and financial influence in the region (foreign exchange reserves \$205 billion in 2017), Saudi Arabia will continue to be one of the most important players in the Middle East arena.

Accordingly, Āl Sa'ūd, the royal family of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, formulates the kingdom's foreign policy by advancing its political priorities, while minimizing hostile external and internal pressures. Primarily, Āl Sa'ūd's decision-making is influenced by concerns about regime survival. Such concerns often dominate the

economic and political forces in Saudi Arabia. However, despite such an utmost caution, the Āl Sa'ūd has been ready to take calculated risks if it is determined that such a policy is in accordance with the aim of regime survival.

An important feature of Āl Sa'ūd's foreign policy is that, at the point of decision-making, it has preferred to leave all options open and thus avoid publicly-declared alliances with any state that might irreversibly alienate Saudi Arabia from other states. Correspondingly, over the past several years, a number of press reports have indicated that Saudi Arabia and Israel share many common interests under the complex geo-strategic circumstances.

Although the Saudis and the Israelis have been on the same side in some of the past conflicts (for instance, during the Yemen War in the 1960s, when *Nasserist* activism was spreading in the Arabian Peninsula), these interests are expressed more openly today than any time before. Subsequently, a major trigger for the warming Saudi-Israel relations can be traced as being a consequence of the regional security challenges. These include, Tehran's theocratic regime and its revolutionary activity, the revolutions inspired by the "Arab Spring", and the threat of radical Islam, on the one hand. Additionally, the warming relations can be traced as a consequence of major economic challenges posed by the evolving Saudi society and the need to diversify the sources of national income following the collapse of the oil prices, on the other hand.

The developing Saudi-Israeli relations are based on mutual interests. Perhaps most notably for Saudi Arabia, stability in the Arabian Peninsula is of utmost importance. In fact, the regime survival is so important factor for the Āl Sa'ūd that, for example, the royal family has been willing to build closer relations with Israel in order to counter the versatile specter of threats that have been menacing Saudi Arabia. For Israel, in turn, stability in the Arabian Peninsula – and Āl Sa'ūd's survival – is almost as equally important, and is directly linked to Israel's own national security interests.

Since its foundation in 1932, Saudi Arabia has faced numerous perils. However, I would like to highlight that Israel has never been a real enemy to Saudi Arabia. Although the Āl Sa'ūd has not been prepared to establish diplomatic relations with Israel, it has not excluded the option of using quiet diplomacy and secret channels of communication. Such an approach, where the Saudi kingdom uses secret channels of communication, is not a unique policy that could only be attributed to Saudi-Israel relations. In fact, quiet, behind the scenes diplomacy is a fundamental characteristic of Saudi foreign policy. Moreover, it would seem

that only if the Saudis become convinced that establishing diplomatic relations with Israel would add substantial benefits – I want to emphasize the point that such a move would not jeopardize Āl Sa‘ūd’s regime survival – the royal family would be ready to pursue this.

Then there is the Palestinian issue, which the Saudis say would need to be solved before the kingdom would normalize its relations with Israel. However, Saudi Arabia’s strategic interests will always be its first priority. Although the Saudis have publicly supported the Palestinians, the issue has often represented multiple security-related problems for the Saudis. In fact, the Palestinian leadership has been a major headache to the Saudis. For instance, Yāsir ‘Arafāt, the Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization (1969–2004), was one of the first foreign leaders to show support for Āyatullāh Ruḥullah Khomeīnī, Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran (r. 1979–1989), after the victory of the 1978-1979 revolution in Iran, while following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, ‘Arafāt sided with Iraqi President Ṣaddām Ḥusayn (r. 1979–2003). Both of these leaders were enemies of Saudi Arabia. In addition, several militant Palestinian groups planned and carried out attacks against the kingdom in the 1970s and 1980s.

Saudi decision-making is calculative in matters concerning important domestic and foreign policy deliberations. One example can be taken from the events of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War (the Yom Kippur War). The Saudis wanted to stay out of the conflict. In fact, for the royal family, the situation was difficult: although it was politically dangerous to stay out of the war, the Āl Sa‘ūd knew that it was even riskier had it been directly involved in the battle against Israel. The Saudis had calculated that their participation in the war would have led into a catastrophic failure and defeat. Therefore, the Saudis informed the Israelis through the US intelligence that the Saudi military had been strictly ordered not to take part in the war against Israel. Furthermore, although the Saudis did not want to have conflict with the Israelis, they did not want to establish diplomatic relations with the Jewish State either. They preferred to follow the developments from the sidelines, and if needed, to utilize various back-channels between the two governments.

Behind its veil of secrecy, the Saudi foreign policy conduct can be characterized by clear objectives and persistence. While the exact events are unknown to academic researchers, it would seem that the Saudi-Israel relations improved significantly in 2017 when Muḥammad ibn Salmān took over the Deputy Prime Minister’s office and was sworn in as the Heir Apparent. An interesting question arises: why Saudi Arabia has now been more eager to develop these relations,

and furthermore, what is the role of Crown Prince Muḥammad ibn Salmān in these political developments?

As I have emphasized earlier, regime survival is a major factor, which influences Saudi decision-making. The Saudis know that Israel represents numerous innovations, including energy, water and agricultural technology. In addition to the Israeli high-tech know-how, the Saudis also appreciate the size of the Israeli economy and markets, its strong defense forces, and its prestigious and skillful intelligence organizations. From the Saudi point of view, establishing diplomatic relations with Israel benefits the kingdom immensely in the long run.

By nature, Saudi policy-making processes are very secretive, highly calculative and manipulative. Although very little is known about the inner workings of the royal family, I would like to emphasize Muḥammad ibn Salmān's personality and leadership skills. According to tribal tradition, only a royal prince, who fulfills certain leadership qualities, is eligible to lead the Saudi kingdom. In accordance with such tribal principles, a Saudi leader needs to use consultation and consensus while making decisions. However, the king is always the final decision-maker. Based on his decision-making and his public appearances, Muḥammad ibn Salmān is undoubtedly a calculative leader – as he should be, but more importantly, he is visionary, passionate and determined leader. As he desires to become the next Saudi king, he is prepared to lead his kingdom for the coming half a century. In order for him to succeed, he needs to make calculated but also brave decisions, so that his monarchy will continue to survive also in the future, and naturally that his people will thrive. A possible decision to establish diplomatic relations with Israel would be a brave move that can only be achieved by a leader who envisions the future of his nation.

The recent normalization treaties between Israel and several Arab states, and the various initiatives that have already followed, indicate that open diplomatic relations with Israel are mutually beneficial, and that they will increase regional stability. Hopefully, the “Abraham Accords” will be a precursor to a *Saudi-Israel Peace Treaty* to be signed in the near future.

**Notes:** This essay is based on Dr. Samuel E. Willner's PhD dissertation titled *Tribal Solidarity, Pragmatism and Family Survival: Āl Sa'ūd and the Enigma of Its Decision-Making during 1973–1980*, which was approved in December 2020.

# THE NARCO-TERROR NEXUS: THE CASES OF AFGHANISTAN, COLOMBIA, AND WEST AFRICA

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## Abstract

Drug trafficking and terrorism, especially, are major challenges for domestic and international security and stability. Although these risks are not new, they have become global, multidimensional, and extremely complicated.<sup>1</sup> Currently there exists a strong relationship between trafficking in narcotics and terrorism. The transnational nature and diversity of these crimes enable criminal networks to work alongside one another with catastrophic consequences.<sup>2</sup> This relationship is generally referred to as 'narco-terrorism'. This paper discusses the overlap between terrorism and narcotics trafficking specifically in Afghanistan, Colombia, and West Africa. This paper is an extract from a research paper that is still in the process of being completed.

## Glossary of Acronyms

UN – United Nations

UNODC – United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

WEF – World Economic Forum

ICCT – International Center for Counter Terrorism

ISS – Institute for Security Studies

ICCLR – International Centre for Criminal Law Reform

BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation

IED – Improvised Explosive Device

GDP – Gross Domestic Product

GWOT – Global War on Terror

GWOD – Global War on Drugs

FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia/Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia

ISIS/L – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Levante)

- 1 Kloeer, A. (2009). Human Trafficking is Al-Qaeda's New Business Model. International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy.
- 2 Martin, CA. (2003). Encyclopaedia of Terrorism. California State University: Dominguez Hill.



ELN – Ejército de Liberación Nacional/ National Liberation Army

AQIM – al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

MUJAO – Mouvement pour l'unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest/Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa

MLF – Macina Liberation Front

GIATC – Global Initiative Against Transnational Crime

Following the end of the Cold War, the world's attention shifted from traditional security threats, which focused primarily on the State; military strength and protection from external threats like wars and attacks, to the potential dangers of transnational crime.<sup>3</sup> As crime transcends national borders, countries are faced with challenges emanating from drug and human trafficking, to organized crime, money laundering, identity-related crime, cybercrime, terrorism, and forms of environmental crime that target the natural resources of a state.

### Demistifying narcoterrorism: A conceptual analysis

There has been much debate about the definition of the term 'narcoterrorism'. Former President Belaúnde of Peru reportedly first used it in 1983 to describe the attacks against the country's anti-narcotics police. Rapidly, the phrase also began to qualify similar attacks perpetrated by the FARC in Colombia. In 1990, Rachel Ehrenfeld, one of the first scholars on the issue, defined 'narcoterrorism' as 'the use of drug trafficking to advance the objectives of certain governments and terrorist organizations'.<sup>4</sup>

Emma Björnehed points out that the definition of 'narcoterrorism' is 'almost dual in character', and 'the emphasis placed on the drug aspect or the terrorism aspect may vary considerably'. She argues that it is a 'problematic concept'— in part as it may imply the 'merger of the two phenomena' — that 'can be argued to complicate rather than facilitate discussions on the two concepts that it embodies'.<sup>5</sup>

perpetrated by drug traffickers to further and protect their economic interests; the resort to drug trafficking and terrorist tactics by state actors; the use of drug trafficking or directly and indirectly related activities by terrorist organizations

3 Giraldo, J., Trinkunas, H. (2013). Transnational Crime. In Collins, A. (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Pp.428–446. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

4 Gomis, B. (2015) Clarifying narco-terrorism. Global Drug Policy Observatory.

5 Björnehed, E. (2016). Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. *Global Crime*, (41). (305–324).

to fund their operations; cooperation between drug traffickers and terrorist organizations for mutual gains; and the merger of drug trafficking organizations and terrorist organizations to carry out both drug trafficking and terrorist activities. Military officials, policy makers and analysts from many countries and international organizations often affirm the existence of systematic links between terrorism and drug trafficking.<sup>6</sup>

The narco-terror phenomenon thus presents itself in two distinctive ways. One, narcotics traffickers use terrorist tactics to further the organization's narcotics enterprise, avoid prosecution, hinder or prevent enforcement activity through intimidation of judges, prosecutors, police and the public. Trafficking organizations share their smuggling routes, money laundering capabilities and other criminal enterprises with terrorist organizations in exchange for money and/or weapons.<sup>7</sup>

Two, narco-terrorism is the alliance between drug producers and an insurgent group carrying out terrorist acts. While the ultimate ends sought by each group are usually different, the alliance offers them immediate benefits. The members of these alliances—the coca growers, drug traffickers, and terrorist groups—often share common goals. These include, but are not limited to, the destabilization of government, the creation of discipline (for market purposes) among growers, and liberation from the meddling of the police and military. Mutual needs make the pursuit of these goals beneficial in some respects to all involved.<sup>8</sup>

### When wicked worlds collide

Before the September 11 attacks against the US, terrorists were mostly funded by state sponsors who used this relationship to secure territories or to gain access to arms networks. As state sponsorship of terrorism has come under increased scrutiny and greater international condemnation, terrorist groups have had to look increasingly at alternative sources of revenue.<sup>9</sup> Don Winslow of 'The Daily Beast' newspaper, who has been reporting on trafficking in narcotics and terrorism respectively over the last decade, stresses terrifying new trend: a

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6 Björnehed, E. (2016). Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. *Global Crime*, (41). (305–324).

7 Martin, CA. (2003). *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*. California State University: Dominguez Hill.

8 Ibid.

9 The Conversation. (2016, February). The little-understood connection between Islamic terror and drug profits.

merging of worlds. Winslow believes that although narcotics and terrorism had been loosely connected in the past (suicide bombers taking tranquilizers before a suicide bombing; insurgent groups fighting under the influence of drugs etc.), a new inclination is starting to develop, i.e., an economic connection.<sup>10</sup>

Terrorism essentially requires financing: finances with which to pay operatives, purchase weapons, for housing, travel, surveillance and to plan operations. Narcotics are easy to acquire and market, with immense profits and the money is easily transferrable. Because these two groups inhabit and operate in largely the same spaces, traffickers of narcotics and terrorists easily connect. Add to that that both groups share common enemies such as intelligence services and law enforcement, the merging of these two worlds was almost unavoidable.<sup>11</sup> Terrorist groups and drug traffickers employ similar techniques concerning their operations. Firstly, both terrorists and traffickers need to control certain areas or spaces. Terrorists must have a space where groups can safely train and plan operations, and traffickers need territory where their drugs are grown or manufactured and then smuggled into the consumer nations.<sup>12</sup>

In order to control a territory, control also needs to be exerted over the local inhabitants. To accomplish this, drug cartels have adopted classic terrorist strategies, such as the double-handed approach which combines public works and generosity (which is referred to as the 'open' hand) with torture, intimidation and murder (which is referred to as the 'closed' hand—a fist). In much the same way terrorists have often garnered support from the locals by providing services in under-developed and under-served rural or inner-city communities that the central government either cannot or will not deliver. Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, a notorious Latin drug cartel boss, has become a local hero and guaranteed local support and protection by building clinics, schools, churches and playgrounds, as well as constructing water systems and having elaborate holiday celebrations. A classic terrorist technique, which has now been adopted by narcotics traffickers.<sup>13</sup>

Publicity is another area where terrorism and drug trafficking overlap. When it comes to terrorism, the purpose is to strike fear into the populace and to provoke

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10 Winslow, D. (2017, December). Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ISIS: When Wicked Worlds Collide. The Daily Beast.

11 The Conversation. (2016, February). The little-understood connection between Islamic terror and drug profits.

12 Winslow, D. (2017, December). Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ISIS: When Wicked Worlds Collide. The Daily Beast.

13 Ibid.

a response from the central government.<sup>14</sup> Without publicity the terrorist act is inconsequential. Here, contemporary terrorists have taken a page out of the drug cartels' book by using social media. Drug cartels started using this method since early 2005 when a four-man team of gunmen attempted to kill a rival trafficker of Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, Edgar Villareal, in the resort town of Acapulco in Mexico. Villareal worked with the local police to help capture his would-be killers, then videotaped them as he forced them to confess their crimes and then executed the four men with pistol shots. He then sent the tape to the media which went viral on the internet. We see terrorist groups, specifically the Islamic State (ISIS), also employ these methods.<sup>15</sup>

Video clips help to spread propaganda which is another mutual goal of both traffickers and terrorists. In the videos, victims are forced to admit to 'crimes' in order to then 'justify' the subsequent execution. Terrorists use these videos to declare their aims and grievances, while cartels use them to declare their moral superiority over rival cartels. The propaganda finds a receptive audience on websites and social media.<sup>16</sup> This leads us to another overlap: recruitment. These videos, though sick and saddening, prove to be a successful tool of recruitment for both traffickers and terrorists alike. Certain audiences, instead of being repulsed, find these videos attractive. On the other hand, survival also forms part of recruitment. In territories that are contested, local inhabitants are forced to take a side and often choose the side where they are the perpetrators of violent acts rather than the victims of it.<sup>17</sup>

Power also plays an important role when recruiting members, especially when particularly young, unemployed and powerless men are enticed to join drug cartels or terrorist groups. An individual who sees himself or herself as having no future will pick the brief but thrilling life of a drug trafficker or terrorist, even with the knowledge that it will most likely end in death. When looking at these intersections between terrorism and drug trafficking, it is worthy to explore

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14 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). *West Africa Under Attack*.

15 Winslow, D. (2017, December). *Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ISIS: When Wicked Worlds Collide*. The Daily Beast.

16 Sangiovanni, E. (2005). *Transnational Networks and New Security Threats*. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, (18) 1. (pp.15-21).

17 Winslow, D. (2017, December). *Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ISIS: When Wicked Worlds Collide*. The Daily Beast.

other aspects of this narco-terror nexus more closely, which is what this paper aims to do in its completion.<sup>18</sup>

### Assessing the threat

Transnational crime has diversified and reached macro-economic proportions: illicit goods are sourced from one continent, trafficked across another, and marketed in a third. Cartels and terrorist organizations are today truly a transnational problem: a threat to security, especially in poor and conflict-ridden countries. These crimes are fueling corruption, infiltrating business and politics, and hindering development. This in turn undermines governance by empowering those who operate outside the law.<sup>19</sup>

Drug cartels, in particular, are spreading violence in Central America, the Caribbean and West Africa, while collusion between insurgents and criminal groups (in Central Africa, the Sahel and South-East Asia) fuels terrorism and plunders natural resources. The smuggling of migrants and modern slavery has spread in Eastern Europe as much as South-East Asia and Latin America. Authorities have lost control to organized gangs; cybercrime threatens vital infrastructure and state security, and pirates from the world's poorest countries (such as Somalia) held to ransom ships from the richest nations. Counterfeit goods undermine licit trade and endanger lives and money-laundering in rogue jurisdictions and uncontrolled economic sectors corrupts the banking sector worldwide.<sup>20</sup>

Terrorism in turn presents a terrifying feat. A total of 11 072 terrorist attacks occurred worldwide in 2016, resulting in over 25 600 deaths and more than 33 800 injuries.<sup>21</sup> After the US declared war on terror, traditional means of funding has since been disabled, resulting in terrorist groups turning to organized criminal activities such as narcotics trafficking as an alternative source of funding.<sup>22</sup> Previously independent criminal and terrorist groups started to alter their purposes and tactics and morph into a single entity exhibiting characteristics of terrorist and criminal organizations simultaneously. It is not only governments

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18 Winslow, D. (2017, December). Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, and ISIS: When Wicked Worlds Collide. *The Daily Beast*.

19 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). *West Africa Under Attack*.

20 Ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Kloer, A. (2009). *Human Trafficking is Al-Qaeda's New Business Model*. International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy.

that are threatened by transnational organized crime and its association with drug trafficking, but all societies are at risk. The very foundations of civil society and sovereignty are threatened by worldwide transnational organized crime and the production of illicit narcotics, since these groups use their ill-gotten gains to intentionally and directly destabilize the political system, the administration and the economy of a country.<sup>23</sup>

This is especially the case in weak and failing states. The territorial integrity both at the borders and within a given country are attacked by these groups. Once control over the territory is established, they have free access and law enforcements find it difficult to penetrate the area, which is then referred as 'grey zones'.<sup>24</sup> These kinds of attacks are highly lucrative for the groups responsible and present a direct gain for those who challenge the authority of the state and the law, from beyond its borders. Relations among states are also being negatively influenced and a cause of great controversy in certain states, owing to the fact that organized crime and drug trafficking are undermining them, even if they might sometimes consider themselves merely countries through which drugs transit. Certain Central and Eastern European countries and some Mediterranean countries are considered to be less reliable partners because of this.<sup>25</sup>

All of the above-mentioned illegal activities support a large criminal economic network referred to as the illicit economy or the shadow economy. This economy has seen unprecedented growth even while its legal counterpart continues to fluctuate globally.<sup>26</sup> The illicit economy is cause for global concern since it has etched its way into all aspects of society, including infrastructure, arts, healthcare, government, civil society, business, and individuals. The illicit economy affects all aspects of society and disrupts the social and economic order. The profits from illicit trade, which is largely rooted in organized crime, forms the illicit economy. The illicit economy is incredibly lucrative and further fueled by the illegal wildlife trade, arms trafficking, human trafficking, counterfeiting or money laundering, to name but a few. Between 2012 and 2014, the Global Agenda Council on Illicit Trade estimated the shadow economy to be worth \$650 billion. In 2015 the shadow economy reached a whopping \$1.77 Trillion. This value is

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23 Paoli, L. (2002). Flexible Hierarchies and Dynamics Disorder: The Drug Distribution System in Frankfurt and Milan. *Drugs: Education, Prevention and Policy*, 9(2). (pp.143–5).

24 Ibid.

25 World Economic Forum. (2015). *Fight Against Global Illicit Economy Turns Dark as Size and Growth Remain Unknown*.

26 Ibid.

expected to continue rising with further technological advancements and the continued internationalization of trade at present. Illicit trade functions at an unprecedented pace and on a massive scale, making it increasingly challenging to tackle. The narco-terror nexus together with the illicit economy makes for an interesting, albeit distressing, research topic.<sup>27</sup>

The problem of terrorist groups and narcotics traffickers working in tandem is not a new one. At the turn of the twenty-first century, Colombian society is in a profound crisis in which illegal drugs play a very complex and important role. Colombia is the only country in the world where the three main plant-based illegal drugs are produced in significant amounts. Colombians are involved in illegal drug production, international smuggling, and marketing. In the 1980s, Colombia became the largest cocaine producer in the world. During the 1990s, it also became the largest coca grower nation. Furthermore, Colombia produces and supplies the lion's share of heroin consumed in the United States and also exports illegal marijuana. Illegal drug production and trafficking in Colombia have marked the past thirty years of the country's history. In no other country has the illegal drug industry had such dramatic social, political, and economic effects.<sup>28</sup>

For decades, Colombia has suffered a number of deadly 'terrorist' attacks at the hands of narcotic traffickers. Since 1934, Colombian Presidents such as Belisario Betancourt, Virgilio Barco and Cesar Gaviria fought against drug cartels such as "Los Extraditables" led by notorious drug lords Pablo Escobar Gaviria and Gonzalo Rodriguez Gacha. With its arid tropical climate and lush land, Colombia is ideal for the sowing and reaping of the coca plant which is then synthesized into the powder cocaine drug.

Thanks to a high demand of cocaine in the US and Europe, Colombian cocaine production skyrocketed, and drug kingpins began to wield immense power. These kingpins, with the profits from the drug trade, could carry out whatever illicit activities that they wanted free from the intervention of the Colombian government, simply because they had the cash reserves to do so.<sup>29</sup>

On 17 January 2019, 22 people were killed and 68 injured in a bombing at the General Santander police academy in Bogotá. The perpetrator of the attack was José Aldemar Rojas, a member of the Ejército de Liberación Nacional-or ELN

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27 Ibid.

28 Samuels, R. J. (2017). Drug cartel. Encyclopaedia Britannica.

29 Tarazona-Sevillano, G., Reuter, B. (1990). Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism. New York: Praeger Publishers.

(National Liberation Army).<sup>30</sup> In recent days rebel groups have taken up arms again and have become even more emboldened since the government announced their attempts to speed up coca eradication in the countryside. This was the case last October, when farmers blocked the military from entering coca farms outside the southern city of Tumaco and officials opened fire, killing several civilians. David Isacson, an analyst on South American socio-political issues in Washington, believes that there will be many more such violent incidents. Colombian coca farmers use approximately an accumulated area of between 169,000 hectares to produce the country's cocaine, according to the UNODC.<sup>31</sup> The organization estimated in 2016 that some 106,000 Colombian farming families live off coca.<sup>32</sup>

Pablo Escobar was a Colombian drug trafficker who controlled over 80 percent of the cocaine transported to the U.S. Escobar entered the cocaine trade in the early 1970s, collaborating with other criminals to form the Medellín Cartel. He earned popularity by sponsoring charity projects and soccer clubs, but later, terror campaigns that resulted in the murder of thousands turned public opinion against him. He was killed by Colombian police in 1993.<sup>33</sup>

Escobar in 1989 ordered the bombing of a building that then housed Colombia's intelligence agency, killing 52 people and injuring 1,000. In 2014, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Latin America's oldest and largest guerrilla army known as the FARC, marked the 50th anniversary of the start of its war against the Colombian government. More than 220,000 people have been killed and more than five million people uprooted from their homes in the conflict, which is the last remaining guerrilla war in the Western Hemisphere. The FARC was deeply involved in the taxation, production, and trafficking of illegal drugs.<sup>34</sup>

On May 16, 2014, the Colombian government and the FARC signed an agreement stating that under the terms of a final peace treaty, the two sides would work in tandem to eradicate coca, the plant used to make cocaine, and to combat cocaine trafficking in areas under guerrilla control. Recently though, the FARC

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30 BBC. (2019, January). Bogotá car bomb: Colombia blames ELN rebels for deadly explosion.

31 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*

32 BBC. (2019, January). Bogotá car bomb: Colombia blames ELN rebels for deadly explosion.

33 Martin, CA. (2003). *Encyclopaedia of Terrorism*. California State University: Dominguez Hill.

34 BBC. (2016, July). *Colombia's Farc to stop charging 'revolutionary tax'*.



has issued a call back to arms from its supporters, signaling a return to pre-peace treaty times. Despite authorities chemically eradicating the coca plants, Colombia had a record potential cocaine production of 1,379 tons in 2017. According to Colombia's Defense Ministry, it destroyed more than 52,000 hectares of coca and seized more than 400 tons of cocaine in 2017 alone.<sup>35</sup>

Recently, West Africa has been entangled in the illegal cocaine trade from Latin America to Europe. Selecting West Africa, a region, rather than one country on the African continent was a deliberate resolution. This region presents a remarkable viewpoint on the narco-terror nexus in that the entire region acts as a drug trafficking route and terrorist hub. This multi-country perspective on the convergence of drug trafficking and terrorism presents a unique vantage point and generates great research value. The involvement of West Africa in the international drug trade is, however, not a new occurrence.<sup>36</sup>

For some time, the UNDOC had warned that West Africa was at risk of becoming an epicenter for drug trafficking and the crime and corruption associated with it. Every year, at least 50 tons of cocaine is transited from the Andean countries to West Africa – then to Europe – where this cocaine is worth almost \$2 billion. Drugs originating from South America enter West Africa through Guinea-Bissau in the north and Ghana in the south. Most of the time the drugs are transported to Europe on commercial flights by drug mules. West African criminal networks distribute these drugs throughout Europe upon arrival.<sup>37</sup>

In the last decade, the drug trade in West Africa has increased exponentially: from 1 323 kilograms in 2005, to 3 161 in 2006, to 6 458 in 2007. Security and development in West Africa are being destabilized and former Executive Director of the UNDOC, Antonio Maria Costa, is quoted as stating, "drug cartels buy more than real estate, banks and businesses, they buy elections, candidates and parties. In a word they buy power".<sup>38</sup>

Large quantities of cocaine first started flowing into West Africa around 2004. This was partly due to a large increase in European demand and tighter controls at Western European ports and airports. The Columbian cartels opened an

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35 Ibid.

36 Ellis, S. (2009). West Africa's International Drug Trade. *African Affairs*, 108 (431). (pp. 171–196).

37 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). *West Africa Under Attack*.

38 Ellis, S. (2009). West Africa's International Drug Trade. *African Affairs*, 108 (431). (pp. 171–196).

alternative route along the 10th parallel, the 2600 km that separates Brazil from Senegal. Its role in cocaine traffic now has law enforcement officials referring to it as “Highway 10”. After the cocaine arrives in West Africa, significant quantities pass through Northern Mali on the way to Europe or the Middle East. Direct transatlantic flights into landlocked Mali have also occurred, as illustrated by the now notorious case of “Air Cocaine” in 2009. A burned-out Boeing 727 referred to as “Air Cocaine” was found on a makeshift sand runway in the desert of Northern Mali. According to the state prosecutor it had up to 11 tons of cocaine on board, implying a retail value approaching half a billion US dollars.<sup>39</sup>

The issue of narco-terror in West Africa is centered around local terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and al Qaeda and their influence on the region. Boko Haram remains a major security challenge for Nigeria and its Lake Chad basin neighbors, and the conflict in the north east has triggered a tragic humanitarian crisis affecting more than seven million people in the region. Boko Haram also has links to the Islamic State and other extremist groups in Africa. There is certainly evidence that Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its offshoot Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) are involved in drug smuggling. The main source of income for AQIM and MUJAO has been ransom money for Western hostages kidnapped in the broader Sahel. According to a former US ambassador to Mali, European governments have paid nearly \$90 million since 2004 to secure the release of their nationals.<sup>40</sup>

These payments have directly contributed to strengthening the position of terrorist groups and stimulating further hostage takings. Malian officials, involved in the negotiations to free the hostages, are also suspected of taking a share of the spoils. These payments and links to narcotics trafficking help explain why the Malian government did not crack-down on AQIM and permitted the North to turn into a de facto terrorist safe haven from 2005-2011. Trafficking routes through West Africa vary. Some pass-through Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco and then on to southern Europe. Others cross the Atlantic bound for the United States. In many cases, Guinea-Bissau is a key trans-shipment point. Drawing on ties to senior political and security leaders, South American drug cartels have used Guinea-Bissau as a hub for many years to smuggle vast quantities of cocaine to Europe. Some shipments sail as far south as Mozambique and South Africa.<sup>41</sup>

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39 Ibid.

40 ICCT. (2013). West Africa and the Sahel.

41 Ibid.

The violent conflict in Mali, initiated in 2012, is complex and continuously evolving: the groups involved include terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Mouvement pour l'Unité and le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, its affiliate Macina Liberation Front (MLF), and Al Mourabitoune. The crisis in the Sahel (from Mali to southern Tunisia and Libya) and the regionalization of Boko Haram's activities as far as the Lake Chad basin (Niger, Cameroon and Chad).<sup>42</sup>

Nowhere in the world has the connection between drugs and terrorism been more publicized than in Afghanistan. Afghanistan, since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, produces ninety-two percent of the overall global illicit opium production. The increase in opium production occurred in tandem with the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan. The country has for the longest time maintained a loose relationship between terrorist organizations, violence, decentralized governance and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). This relationship has coalesced into a truly narco-terrorism driven system. Corruption, lawlessness, instability, violence, and human suffering all contribute to, and result from, the precipitous increase in opium cultivation and narcotics production and trafficking.<sup>43</sup>

Afghanistan has been unstable for decades with rival armed groups vying for control. Numerous festering problems and regional tensions-which date back decades-are converging in Afghanistan today. Not only are narcotics significant as the principal economic driver among this collection of problems, but it also represents the single issue in which the largest number of relevant players in the conflict have a direct stake.<sup>44</sup>

Since the 2001 invasion and the lifting of the Taliban opium ban, opium production in Afghanistan has increased to well above 70 percent of the overall global illicit opium production today. This upsurge has occurred in tandem with the deteriorating security situation augmented by the 2001 coalition invasion of the country. The loose relationship between terrorist groups, violence, decentralized

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42 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2016). West Africa Under Attack.

43 Markowitz, L., Omelicheva, MY. (2019). Does Drug Trafficking Impact Terrorism? Afghan Opioids and Terrorist Violence in Central Asia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 42(12). (pp.1021–1043).

44 Ibid.

governance, and poverty that existed prior to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Afghanistan, has merged into a truly narco-terrorism-driven system.<sup>45</sup>

The catalysts behind this marked increase in both Afghanistan's overall opium production, and in the country's percentage of total world production are three-fold:

1. Ongoing warfare and civil strife;
2. The historical absence of a legitimate centralized government;
3. Effective contemporary interdiction campaigns elsewhere in the world.

Furthermore, in the wake of the coalition invasion in 2001, the first two elements have worsened, and a fourth element, a "marriage of convenience" between insurgency forces and the opium industry, has come to exist.<sup>46</sup>

As former Afghan President Hamid Karzai has stated, "*The question of drugs ... is one that will determine Afghanistan's future. ... [I]f we fail, we will fail as a state eventually, and we will fall back in the hands of terrorism*". This statement was brought to fruition when Afghanistan saw a resurgence of insurgency from 2017 onward, losing large regions of Afghan territory to the Taliban and ISIS/L.

In 2017 the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) carried out an attack on a military hospital in Kabul, killing more than 40 people. This incident occurred two days after the Afghan military announced that its "Shaheen 25" operations had slain 250 Islamic State militants in the Nangarhar Province. Two months prior to this, an improvised explosive device (IED) wounded three American soldiers in Jalalabad, the capital city of Nangarhar. On 2 November 2020, the University of Khabul also suffered a terrorist attack. 35 people were killed and 50 were injured (US Central Command, 2020). Narcotics trafficking funds, compounds, and propagates the political instability and insurgency in Afghanistan.<sup>47</sup>

## CONCLUSION

The three main cases—each containing weak regions wracked by violent conflict—represents the most significant examples of global efforts over the past

45 Markowitz, L., Omelicheva, MY. (2019). Does Drug Trafficking Impact Terrorism? Afghan Opioids and Terrorist Violence in Central Asia. *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 42(12). (pp.1021-1043).

46 Ibid.

47 Abed, F., Mashal, M. (2017, March). New York Times. Kabul Military Hospital in Afghanistan comes under attack.

three decades to combat narcotics production and terrorism. Governments in these regions have faced an especially stark tradeoff between their desire to limit belligerents' resources and the need to win the hearts and minds of the population. Colombia, the world's largest producer of cocaine, is frequently presented as the poster child for the conventional government view of drugs and insurgency. The country has seen various hostile groups, notably the leftist group FARC, expand dramatically because of their participation in the drug trade. Afghanistan has been the largest producer of opiates in the world since the mid-1990s. Since the mid-2000s, production of opium there has reached levels unprecedented in the modern history of the drug trade.<sup>48</sup> Much of the internal dynamics of the nexus of drugs and insurgency in Afghanistan is identical or parallel to the dynamics in Colombia. But Afghanistan greatly surpasses Colombia when it comes to the size of the illicit economy— its economic significance in terms of the number of people that it employs and as a percentage of the country's GDP. Over the last decade, Africa has become one of the most important locations in the struggle against terrorism and the fight against narcotics trafficking. West Africa in particular, has come to epitomise the nexus of drugs and insurgency. West Africa illustrates the extreme difficulty of state-building in a region where an illicit economy constitutes the dominant economic sector and where a multitude of actors across all sectors of society (insurgents, terrorists, tribes, government officials and representatives, and the rural population) participate in the illicit economy.<sup>49</sup>

Also, when one normally considers terrorism, the typical thought process involves jihadists and Islamic terrorist groups. This might be the case for Afghanistan and parts of West Africa, but various regions in the world experience terrorism without the radical Islamic component. Colombia for one has been at the mercy of terrorists for decades, but these groups display no radical Islamic tendencies. These regions were chosen specifically for their diversity and divergent backgrounds which lends an element of authenticity to the study.

This research also specifically probes the connection between the global illicit economy and the narco-terror-nexus. The objective is to analyze the methods of both terrorist groups and drug traffickers and the convergence between the two types of organizations in recent decades.

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48 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2010). *The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment*

49 Van Zyl, I., Yahia, JB. (2019). *Institute for Security Studies*. (2019).

A phenomenon such as narco-terrorism is of significance to the entire international community. Narco-terror has the potential to become a large-scale threat in terms of global reach, penetration, and impact. As markets have become more globalized, so have opportunities for illicit groups to transact with each other. Member states have a shared responsibility to respond to this threat.<sup>50</sup> Research in this regard assists in contributing to new ways of looking at and combatting these crimes. This study helps to answer important questions and demonstrates the role that consumers, law enforcement and globalization play in the growth of transnational crimes.

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<sup>50</sup> Björnehed, E. (2016). Narco-Terrorism: The Merger of the War on Drugs and the War on Terror. *Global Crime*, (41). (305-324).

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# CHINESE MARITIME EXPANSION AND DOCTRINAL INNOVATION

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## Abstract

This paper is part of a broader work examining the grand strategy and doctrines of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and will focus on PRC's strategic culture and doctrine in relation to technology, innovation and maritime operations. Specifically, this paper will examine a selection of doctrines introduced by the PRC in response to the US's RMA and the Soviet MTR; focusing on strategic cultural drivers, their effect on both technological innovation and acquisition, as well as maritime doctrines in the 'near' and 'far' seas, including the Horn of Africa.

## Glossary of Acronyms

A2/AD – Anti Access, Area Denial

AI – Artificial Intelligence

AMS – (Chinese) Academy of Military Science

ASB – Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile

ASW – Anti-Submarine Warfare

C2 – Command and Control

C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Information

C4ISTAR – Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information/Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance

CCG – China Coast Guard

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

CMC – Central Military Commission

CONOPS – Concept of Operations

EMP – Electromagnetic Pulse

EW – Electronic Warfare

FBIS – Foreign Broadcast Information Service

FONOPS – Freedom of Navigation Operations

HGV – Hypersonic Glide Vehicle

HMP – High-Powered Microwaves



IT-RMA – Information-Technology Revolution in Military Affairs  
LSG – Leading Small Group  
MLP – National Medium-and Long-Term Plan  
MTR – Military-Technical Revolution  
NHTP – National Hi-Technology Program (Program 863)  
ONA – Office of Net Assessment  
PAFMM – People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia  
PGMs – Precision Guided Munitions  
PLA – People’s Liberation Army  
PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Airforce  
PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy  
PLASSF – People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force  
PRC – People’s Republic of China  
RMA – Revolution in Military Affairs  
RSTA – Reconnaissance, Surveillance, Targeting Acquisition  
SCS – South China Sea  
SIGL – State Informatization Leading Group  
SLBM – Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile  
UAV – Unmanned Arial Vehicle  
URW – Unrestricted Warfare  
UUV – Unmanned Underwater Vehicle

This paper will examine the grand strategy of People’s Republic of China (PRC) through its various doctrines, with a focus on strategic culture and its effect on both doctrinal and technological innovation and acquisition. The paper will define the concepts, before examining a selection of doctrines introduced by the PRC in response to the US’s Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Soviet Military-Technical Revolution (MTR). In addition, the PRC’s progressive maritime expansion. from anti-access area denial (A2/AD) doctrines in the “*near seas*”, to the “*far seas*” will be examined with some of their implications.

### **Definitions of Terms and Concepts**

The first section will introduce the definitions of “*doctrine*” and its place within “*strategy*” and “*grand strategy*”, as well as, “*innovation*” and “*measures of strategic effectiveness*” and “*cultural analysis*”.

Barry Posen conceives of grand strategy broadly as;

“A chain of political ends and military means. Its effectiveness is highly dependent on the extent to which the ends and means are related to one another. The “knitting together” of political ends and military means I call political-military integration”.<sup>1</sup>

Military doctrine in this context is considered as a subcomponent of grand strategy, dealing with military means to ensure the survival of the state. It must be innovative in providing the tools (*means*) to achieve political objectives (*ends*) and can be further divided into three operational categories; *offensive, defensive and deterrent*. Doctrine is created by military and civilian elites, according to Posen “*civil-military relations*”; using analysis of the prevailing conditions of that state internally, as well as externally vis a vis its adversaries.<sup>2</sup>

Colin Gray includes “*Theory* (ideas purporting to explain strategic behavior) and *Doctrine* (Explicit guidance for behavior) into a complex model of strategy which includes 17 non-hierarchical dimensions (which he concedes cannot be assumed to include every possible strategic dimension).<sup>3</sup>

It is also from Gray we draw the definition of strategic effectiveness as;

“The net (i.e. with the adversary dimension factored in) effectiveness of grand strategic performance, which is to say of behavior relevant to the threat or actual use of force. That effectiveness can be measured in regard to the advancement of political goals. Military effectiveness, even in the form of a series of crushing victories, need not equate to strategic effectiveness because strategy’s political dimension may shape a contest that is all but beyond military help”.<sup>4</sup>

Posen’s early work on doctrine and innovation triggered a wave of new scholarship. Adam Grissom suggests four schools; Posen’s Civil-Military, as well as, Interservice, Intraservice and Cultural Models.<sup>5</sup> This paper which will focus on the Cultural school, which, in the collectivist and hierarchical PRC, innovation is considered top down.

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1 Posen, B. (1984). *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between World Wars*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press.

2 Ibid.

3 Gray, C. (2002). *Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History*. Taylor & Francis Group.

4 Ibid.

5 Grissom, A. (2006). The Future of Military Innovation Studies. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 29(5).

In examining doctrinal innovation in the PRC, it is useful to consider Adamski's work on Strategic Culture, in which he expands upon the existing literature, arguing that rather than rejecting neorealism's centrality of rationalism, cultural analysis can be thought of as supplement to neorealism in explaining states' strategic behavior due to the fact that:

"Rationality is neither objective nor universal – rational behavior is culturally dependent. Actors formulate their preferences not in accordance with a universal logic of efficacy, but according to their own norms, values, and self-image".<sup>6</sup>

By contrasting the cognitive processes and conceptualizations used by different states to harness the changes in warfare brought about by the technological advances involved in the IT-RMA; Adamski begins by stating that a military "*revolution*" does not by definition require technology, nor is it limited by time, rather argues that the;

"The ability to diagnose and to understand the discontinuity in the nature of war—the rapid change in ways and means of fighting— is probably the most critical aspect of defense management".<sup>7</sup>

In comparing the PRC to the cultural and cognitive characteristics described by Adamski, this paper will consider that the social structure is *collectivist*,<sup>8</sup> and Chinese communication style as *high context*.<sup>9</sup> The case of Chinese collectivism is most pronounced in the concept of "Military-Civil Fusion", in which the breadth and depth of doctrinal application by the military elites influence all levels of strategic civilian planning.<sup>10</sup> China's time orientation is *polychronic*, which has a large bearing on its strategic patience;<sup>11</sup> all Chinese leaders, with popular support, strove to revive China's standing since it's decline in the wake of the Opium Wars.

6 Adamski, D. (2010). *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*. Stanford: Stanford Security Studies.

7 Ibid.

8 Powel, R. (2018). *The Role of Collectivism in Chinese Culture and its Impact on Conflict Management and International Business Relations*. Bournemouth University.

9 Ming-Jer, C. (2015, March). The Nuances of Cross Cultural Communication. *Ideas to Action: Communication, Leadership & Managment*.

10 Pillsbury, M. (2015). *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

11 Kennedy, B. (2012). *It's About Time - Understanding China's Strategic Patience*. Department of Military Strategy, Planning and Operations. Carlisle: United States War College.

Most recently in 2017, President Xi Jinping outlined the “*Chinese Dream*” aiming to be a leader in technological innovation by 2035 and consolidate its power by the PRC’s 100th anniversary in 2049.<sup>12</sup> Most importantly, Chinese cognitive style is *holistic dialectical*,<sup>13</sup> which Adamsky considers to be an indicator of greater aptitude in understanding RMAs.<sup>14</sup>

## Chinese Culture and its effects on PRC Grand Strategy and Innovation Doctrine

In this section, the paper will tie together culture with the grand strategy of the PRC and select mechanisms of doctrinal change and technological advancement. It should be noted that there is no publicly available grand strategy document published by the Chinese Government,<sup>15</sup> however, analysts argue that none the less, trends are observable, guided by the principles of sovereignty, modernity and stability,<sup>16</sup> as well as core interests of safeguarding the political system, protecting territorial integrity and maintaining China’s sustained and stable economic development.<sup>17</sup> Likewise, doctrine, can be traced through white papers, institutional changes, force postures and asset acquisition.

While a full review of Chinese culture is impossible, some core principles should be pointed out. The first is China’s Sino-centric perception of itself as the “*Middle Kingdom*”, a civilization which “*always existed*” and ruled the world both in culture and technology. It did so with the use of stratagems such as “*use the barbarian to control the barbarian*”, and those of the Taoist strategist Sun Tzu. The philosophy of Confucius (551–479 BCE) with its focus of education and social harmony became a guiding principle of the state,<sup>18</sup> though they should not be thought of as the only schools of thought. One of the rival schools; Legalism, a system of

12 Erickson, A. (2019). *Make China Great Again: Xi's Truly Grand Strategy*. War on the Rocks

13 Scobell, A. (2005). Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie. *Strategic Insights*, 9(10).

14 Adamsky, D. (2010). *The Culture of Military Innovation: The Impact of Cultural Factors on the Revolution in Military Affairs in Russia, the US, and Israel*. Stanford: Stanford Security Studies.

15 Stanzel, A., Jacob, J., Melanie Hart, M., Rolland, N. (2018). Grand Designs: Does China Have a "Grand Strategy?". *China Analysis*.

16 Finkelstien, D. (2007). China's National Military Strategy: An Overview of the "Military Strategic Guidelines". *Asia Policy*.

17 Alison, A., Kaufman, D., Harnett, T. (2016). *Managing Conflict: Examining Recent PLA Writings on Escalation Control*. CNA. Arlington: CNA's China Studies Division.

18 Kissinger, H. (2011). *On China*. New York: Penguin Press.

rule *by law* and *realpolitik* in its outlook, rose to greater prominence in the years following the Opium Wars. Where Confucianism stressed Chinese preeminence and rejected all things foreign as inferior, Legalism allowed for the view that China needed to acquire Western technology and understanding in order to regain its wealth and power.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, for the Chinese, a 5000-year-old civilization, the period of Western dominance since the Century of Humiliation began with the Opium Wars, Unequal Treaties Period and the Invasion of Japan,<sup>20</sup> is a painful historical anomaly which must be corrected. Thus, we can observe all of these schools influencing current Chinese strategic culture under a “*Cult of Defense*” also known as “*Active Defense*”; under which any military action is viewed as; defensive, just, and that to date, the modern PRC has a 100% record of success in its actions, as success is not gauged at the operational level, rather at the strategic “*overall situation*”.<sup>21</sup>

The gradual, yet steady evolution of Chinese doctrine, in line with its Grand strategy and the cultural principles mentioned above can be observed from its first “*five-year plan*” of 1953, which focused on industrial development and essentially copied the soviet model. In 1958, the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) was created, reporting directly to the Central Military Commission (CMC) and is the main source of military doctrine to this day.<sup>22</sup>

In 1978 Deng Xiaoping set the “*Four Modernizations*”; industry, science, technology and agriculture while leaving defense lowest in priorities. Deng is famous for his 1989 adaptation of Sun Tzu’s stratagem “*appear weak when you are strong, and strong when you are weak*” to “*hide your strength, bide your time*”<sup>23</sup> demonstrating the confluence of traditions in Chinese thought.

In 1986 recognizing the need for information technology, the *State Economic Information Management LSG* was created and reformed in 1999 and 2001 as

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- 19 Newmyer Deal, J. (2013). Tracing China's Long Game Plan: Reviewed Work(s): Wealth and Power: China's Long March to the Twenty-First Century by Orville Schell and John Delury. *The National Interest*(127).
  - 20 Raunig, C. (2017). *A Sense of Sovereignty: How China's Century of Humiliation Affects U.S. Policy in the South China Sea*. Naval History and Heritage Command.
  - 21 Scobell, A. (2005). Strategic Culture and China: IR Theory Versus the Fortune Cookie. *Strategic Insights*, 9(10).
  - 22 Wuthnow, J. (2019). China's "New" Academy of Military Science: A Revolution in Theoretical Affairs? *China Brief*, 19(2).
  - 23 Thompson, T. (2015). China (re)turns to the sea: the persistence of the past. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 69(4).

*State Informatization Leading Group (SILG)*.<sup>24</sup> In the same year, the *National Hi-Technology Program*, or *Program 863* was created to address the aforementioned gaps. It laid the ground subsequent programs such as the *National Medium- and Long-Term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology (2005–2020)*. These programs highlight “*indigenous innovation*”, and increasingly advanced technologies obtained by means ranging from technology transfers, licit and illicit, as well as sending students and scientists for education and training in the West.<sup>25</sup>

It should also be noted that at the time of the 1986 reforms, only a small percentage of the population was educated to a basic level. However, the 1985-’95 education plan was implemented. By 1995, 67.1% were enrolled in primary school, 31% at secondary level, 1.5% at tertiary level – only 3% of the relevant age group were in college or university (2.8 million under grads and 130,000 graduate students).<sup>26</sup>

As such, an educational doctrine known as *Project 211*, part of the 9<sup>th</sup> five-year plan 1996-2000 “*seeks to enhance via state assistance the educational capacity of China’s top 100 universities – that can help china compete on the world stage*”.<sup>27</sup> By 2017, the total number of students completing advanced studies overseas alone reached 5,194,900 with 3,132,000 students or 83.73% of these students returning to China after graduation.<sup>28</sup> From 3% in 1995, in 2018 close to 50% of related age groups were enrolled in tertiary education inside China with 38.3 million enrolled students, and the largest absolute number of students studying overseas of any country on earth.<sup>29</sup>

## PLA Response to the MTR and RMA

The Chinese were well aware of the developments of the Soviet MTR and US technological advancements which would become known as the RMA.<sup>30</sup> After

24 Raud, M. (2016). *China and Cyber: Attitudes, Strategies, Organisation*. Tallin: NATO Cooperative Cyber Centre of Excellence (NATO CCD COE).

25 Pillsbury, M. (2015). *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

26 Hudson, C. (1997). *The China Handbook*. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearburn Publishers.

27 Ibid.

28 MOE. (2018). *Brief Report on Chinese Overseas Students and International Students in China 2017*. Ministry of Education: The People’s Republic of China

29 Textor, C. (2020). *Education in China – Statistics & Facts*. Statista

30 Newmyer, J. (2010). The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33(4).

the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and having witnessed and drawn lessons from the Gulf war of the same year, they were anxious to avoid what they perceived as the American trap into which the Soviet Union fell, by over overreaching their limited means, trying to match the US in an overt, symmetric military buildup.<sup>31</sup>

In 1993, following the First Gulf War, there was a push towards “*winning local wars under modern, high technology conditions*”<sup>32</sup> and the PLAN focused its maritime strategy on its near seas operations with the doctrine of “*offshore defense*” and “*limited area denial*”, known to the west as A2/AD.<sup>33</sup> In keeping with use of stratagems; the doctrine of “*the Inferior Defeats the Superior*” holds that the enemy must be held complacent, and unsuspecting, while secret weapons, known as “*the Assassin’s Mace*” are developed. Outlined by PRC strategists in the 1995 work “*The Military Revolution in Naval Warfare*”, various such weapons were discussed, notably, the strategists directly linked Naval success to the domination of space.<sup>34</sup> Similarly, in the same year, Maj. General Wang Pufeng of the AMS, wrote “*The Challenge of Information Warfare*” highlighting the above-mentioned doctrine and expanding on technological improvements which prominently included cultivating talent in the related industries.<sup>35</sup>

A remarkable example of Chinese strategic thought can be found in “*Unrestricted Warfare*” (URW), a book by PLAAF Colonels; Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in 1999.<sup>36</sup> The translation was provided by the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).<sup>37</sup> The editor notes that its publication by the People’s Liberation Army publishing house, suggests that the book was endorsed by elements of the PLA leadership. Over 100 PLA generals requested copies, it was compulsory

31 Pillsbury, M. (2015). *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

32 Kania, E. (2016). The PLA’s Forthcoming Fifth-Generation Operational Regulations—The Latest “Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs”? *China Brief*, 16(7).

33 Zhengyu, W. (2019). Towards Naval Normalcy: 'Open Seas Protection' and Sino-US Maritime Relations. *The Pacific Review*, 32(4).

34 Pillsbury, M. (2015). *The Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower*. New York: Henry Holt and Company.

35 Wang, P. (1995). *The Challenge of Information Warfare: Major General Wang Pufeng is a former Director of the Strategy Department, Academy of Military Science, Beijing*. His paper was excerpted from *China Military Science* (Spring 1995). Federation of American Scientists (FAS): Chinese Intelligence-Related Documents

36 Qiao, L. Wang, X. (1999). *Unrestricted Warfare*. (FBIS, Trans.) Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House.

37 CIA. (2009). *Library: Foreign Broadcast Information Service*.

reading for certain cadres, and most importantly, Unrestricted Warfare was read by both President Jiang Zemin and Defense Minister Chi Haotian.<sup>38</sup>

Examination of the text and footnotes reveals an extremely in depth understanding of Western military history, theory and practice, centered around observations of the First Gulf War of 1991 and the RMA.<sup>39</sup> Whilst the authors quote Clausewitz, the ideas contained are far from the Western concept of decisive battle and closer to the traditional Chinese military writings which focus on stratagems.<sup>40</sup> While the Chinese do not reject kinetic power, indeed, they strive to Westernize militarily and compete in high technology fields in all domains;<sup>41</sup> URW examines the declining utility in the paradigm of traditional forms of armed conflict and suggests that non-kinetic means; such as information, economic, cultural or cyber warfare, used in combination, could give a weaker state the advantage in modern combat. URW refers to a new conception of the battle space, whereby there is no longer a front line and all areas of society and human endeavor can be weaponized or targeted.<sup>42</sup>

### **Techonology and Doctrines in the Nears Seas – A2/AD**

The PRC has continued to build it's military capabilities in a manner which follows the trends outlined above, using strategic incrementalism, or salami slicing, to facilitate its grand strategic plans below the threshold for open warfare with the Western world. Despite unerstanding the concept much earlier, the PRC waited until its 2004 White Paper to describe its "RMA with Chinese Charateristics".<sup>43</sup> While acknowledging that the PLAN has begun to develop its "far seas" or blue water capabilities, the following section will outline the course of this evolution in the context of the near seas and A2/AD; including increased modernization and informatization with PLAN at the center, as outlined in it's 2006 Defence White

38 Lee, S. (2014). China's "Three Warfares": Origins, Applications, and Organisations. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 2.

39 Scobell, A. (2000). Introduction to Review Essays on "Unrestricted Warfare". *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, 11(1).

40 Corn, T. (2010). Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy With Chinese Characteristics. *Small Wars Journal*.

41 USCC. (2018). *Hearing on China's Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for the United States*. Hearing Before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission.

42 Commin, G., Filiol, E. (2015). Unrestricted Warfare versus Western Traditional Warfare: A Comparative Study. *Journal of Information Warfare*, 14(1).

43 Blasko, D. (2015). The 2015 Chinese Defense White Paper on Strategy in Perspective: Maritime Missions Require a Change in the PLA Mindset. *China Brief*, 15(2).



Paper,<sup>44</sup> emphasis on space in 2015,<sup>45</sup> as well as earlier supporting asymmetrical doctrines.

In 2003, the “*Three Warfares Strategy*” introduced sophisticated doctrines into the realms of Legal, Public Opinion and Psychological warfare, to facilitate actions, in contested areas; drawing the attention of Andy Marshall and the ONA.<sup>46</sup>

2006 marked the beginning of “*Grey Zone*” activities, also known as “*War without Gun Smoke*” in the SCS, comprised of a fishing fleet trained and equipped as a maritime militia (PAFMM), the Coast Guard (CCG) and PLAN.<sup>47</sup> Beyond using the specially reinforced vessels to ram those of other nations, the three fleets combined to dominate contested reefs such as Scarborough through “*Cabbage Strategy*”, by wrapping an island “*layer by layer like a cabbage*” with PAFMM, CCG and PLAN vessels.<sup>48</sup>

China has steadily built up its ballistic missile capability as part of its A2/AD doctrine. These range from submarine-based nuclear JL-2-SLBMs, to the DF-21D-ASBM, created to target US Aircraft Carriers, and the DF-26, nuclear capable “*Guam Killer*” with a range of up to 5000kms. In 2019, the PRC unveiled the DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)<sup>49</sup> in a show of advanced military innovation; the US currently does not possess HGV technology.

In line with its PLAN asset modernization and informatization reforms, much has been invested into terrestrial optic-cable and computer networks to

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44 Erickson, A., Chase, M. (2011). Informatization and the Chinese People’s. In Saunders, P., Yung, C., Swain, M., Yang, A. (Eds.), *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?* (pp. 247–286). Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies.

45 PRC. (2015). *China’s Military Strategy (Full Text)*. The State Council, The People’s Republic of China.

46 Halper, S. (2013). *China: The Three Warfares For Andy Marshall Director, Office of Net Assessment Office of the Secretary of Defense Washington D.C.* Cambridge: University of Cambridge.

47 Erickson, A., Martinson, R. (2019). *China’s Maritime Grey Zone Operations*. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

48 China News. (2013). *China Boasts of Strategy to “Recover” Islands Occupied by Phillipines: Recently, well-known military expert Major General Zhang Zhaozhong talked in a TV interview in Beijing about the current situation of dispute between China and the Phillipines in the South China Sea and analysed China’s Strategy in the South China Sea Region*. China News: Defence & Aerospace

49 Stratfor. (2019). *China Lifts the Veil on Its Advanced Weaponry*. Stratfor Worldview Global Intelligence

enhancing existing C2 networks and C4ISR. Likewise, this has also taken place in space, which is considered “*as vital as any battlefield on Earth*”<sup>50</sup> In addition to communications and targeting assets, the PLASSF, currently possess a range of counter space weapons which can be grouped into 4 main categories. *Kinetic Physical*; including direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles or Co-orbital ASATs, which are satellites which can remain dormant in orbit before seeking out and destroying its target upon activation. *Non-Kinetic Physical*; include such weapons as electromagnetic pulse (EMP), lasers and high-powered microwaves (HPM) all of which have detrimental physical effects without requiring direct physical contact. *Electronic*; such as jamming, which is a reversible form of attack engaged through interfering with radio signals either in up or downlink, or spoofing which inserts false signal into an adversary’s communications or GPS / navigation systems. Finally, *Cyber*; which attacks the data itself either through monitoring communications, causing the destruction of data, or even the operability of the satellite.<sup>51</sup>

All of the weapon types listed above have been used or tested. The spectrum presents the PRC the ability to carry out strikes which range from “*loud*” and obvious to both parties, as well as the public; such as kinetic physical, to various “*quiet*” methods which can keep attacks below the threshold for open retaliation, or obfuscate the origin altogether such as cyber.<sup>52</sup>

## Far Seas Doctrine

In 2004, President Hu first announced an expansion of the PLAN role in the “*New Historic Missions*” speech, adding “*expanding national interests*” & “*upholding world peace*” and subsequent Defense White Papers in 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010 expanded the PLAN range.

Since President Xi Jinping rose to power in 2012, there has been an increased level of assertiveness on the part of the PRC across the spectrum of its economic and military fields.<sup>53</sup> In 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its maritime

50 Erickson, A., Chase, M. (2011). Informatization and the Chinese People’s. In Saunders, P., Yung, C., Swain, M., Yang, A. (Eds.), *The Chinese Navy: Expanding Capabilities, Evolving Roles?* (pp. 247–286). Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs Institute for National Strategic Studies.

51 CSIS. (2019). *Space Threat Assessment 2019*. CSIS Center for Strategic & International Studies.

52 Ibid.

53 Jennings, P. (2019). *Clarity and Consistency needed in Australia’s China Policy*. The Strategist

counterpart the String of Pearls was announced; an ambitious network of ports, roads and railways stretching out from China, across the Indian Ocean and beyond in order to facilitate trade and cooperation between the PRC and linked nations. The project and practices have drawn concerns from various quarters over issues of sovereignty,<sup>54</sup> which cannot be separated in the context of China's grand strategy and its maritime far seas strategy.

Coinciding with the BRI announcement, the "2013 Defense White Paper" marked the beginning of the "far seas" strategy, declaring that the PLAN had begun;

"Developing blue water capabilities of conducting mobile operations, carrying out international cooperation, and countering non-traditional security threats, and enhanc[ing] its capabilities of strategic deterrence and counterattack".<sup>55</sup>

Likewise, from 2008 until the present, PLAN has engaged in counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden providing them with operational and logistical experience vital to the far seas mission.<sup>56</sup>

In 2017, China opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, which demonstrated a significant shift in its policy against military bases on foreign soil. Construction has continued with new a new port capable of berthing the largest PLAN ships, providing an important resupply and forward operating base for operations in and around the Horn of Africa.<sup>57</sup>

These operations could include the extraction of Chinese nationals from conflict zones, but also allows for enhanced intelligence collection and power projection capabilities over some of the world's most strategic waterways. China is acting to secure its sea lines of communications over the Indian ocean and strategic choke points such as Bab el Mandeb.<sup>58</sup>

The far seas fleet has shown itself to be involved in both law enforcement, military as well as diplomatic missions. In 2019, on the anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre, a flotilla of three PLAN warships returning from the Gulf of

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54 Tiezzi, S. (2019). *The Belt and Road: Calculating Winners and Losers*. The Diplomat

55 Sharman, C. (2015). China Moves Out: Stepping Stones Towards a New Maritime Strategy. *Center For The Studies Of Chinese Military Affairs Institute For National Strategic Studies China Perspectives*, 9.

56 Ibid.

57 Dutton, P., Kardon, I., Kennedy., C. (2020). Djibouti: China's First Overseas Strategic Strongpoint. *China Maritime Report*, 6.

58 Ibid.

Aden made an unannounced visit in Sydney Harbor. Unlike many diplomatic port calls, in which the reason is a show of friendship, the heavily armed Chinese soldiers on deck in addition to the timing indicated it was instead a show of force, a kind of gunboat diplomacy from Australia's largest trading partner.<sup>59</sup>

Most recently, In December 2019, Russia, China and Iran held joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman drawing the ire of the U.S. with the PRC describing the exercise as "*normal military to military co-operation – not necessarily connected to the regional situation*".<sup>60</sup>

## Conclusion

This paper has examined doctrine in relation to technology and innovation, specifically those relating to maritime doctrine and strategy of the PRC and its near and far seas including the Horn of Africa. Through examination of the history and strategic culture, the following observations can be drawn in line with work of the scholars outlined in the first section of this paper.

In terms of Strategic Cultural theory, China does not have a continuous history as a seafaring nation it does however have geographical and historical reasons to be wary of sea powers, as well as the strategic desire to become one.

All Chinese leaders, with popular support, strove to revive China's standing since its decline in the wake of the Opium Wars. Most recently in 2017, President Xi Jinping outlined the "*Chinese Dream*" aiming to be a leader in technological innovation by 2035 and consolidate its power by the PRC's 100th anniversary in 2049.<sup>61</sup>

China, first through its broad understanding of the technological trends and shift in warfare brought about by the MTR and RMA, followed by its use of strategic incrementalism, show a both a holistic dialectical cognitive style, and polychronic time orientation. The Chinese concept of Civil-Military fusion, is reminiscent of Posen, though rather than simply pertaining to elites, the PRC's collectivist societal structure allows for a top down, all-encompassing fusion of all elements of society and statecraft; such as education, business and military. This allows for strategic ends to align gradually with available means, through the direction

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59 Jennings, P. (2019). *Clarity and Consistency needed in Australia's China Policy*. The Strategist

60 Foy, H. (2019). *Russia, China and Iran Launch Gulf of Oman War Games: US Rivals project increased Middle East influence with first joint naval exercises*. Financial Times

61 Erickson, A. (2019). *Make China Great Again: Xi's Truly Grand Strategy*. War on the Rocks

of theories and doctrines in a complex strategic matrix just as Gray describes. Likewise, as per Gray's definition, the strategic measure of effectiveness of the PRC's approach can be seen clearly in the South China Seas. Despite FONOPs by the US and Allies, regional protests and legal rulings, the PRC's combination of non-kinetic means such as those of the Three Warfares and Cabbage strategies, various types of Grey Zone warfare with high technology assets such as space-based systems, advanced missiles and subsurface warfare have allowed them to build and harden the disputed islands with minimum cost exactly in the manner of Gray's definition.

China has demonstrated ability to form effective grand strategy, harnessing Sino centrism and encompassing economic expansion in coordination with phased military growth. This combined with the ability of its practitioner community to learn and adapt tactics as well as strategies, although yet unproven or tested in modern battle, make China an unpredictable and powerful adversary as well as an interesting case study in maritime strategy and culture. The strategic incrementalism evident in China's rise represents both risk and opportunity, requiring careful analysis by each nation.

Moving forward, China is investing further into advanced technologies such as AI and quantum computing, UAVs and UUVs, advanced undersea sensors known as the "*the Undersea Great Wall*" to increase its ASW, C4ISTAR and military strike complex capabilities. The top down nature of the PRC allows for direct funding into both industry and innovation, as well as education.<sup>62</sup> Civil-Military Fusion and its related educational and acquisition doctrines have been a core element in China's advances, its importance is illustrated by President Xi's leadership of the relevant governing bodies.<sup>63</sup> As the pace of China's technological and doctrinal revolutions have increased, so has its willingness to demonstrate the power of its "*RMA with Chinese characteristics*" representing an apparent shift from Deng's aforementioned stratagem, though it continues to obfuscate where possible. This shift has been described as one from concealment to uncertainty.<sup>64</sup> It is worthy

62 Nurkin, T. (2018). *China's Advanced Weapon Systems: Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission*. Jane's by IHS Markit

63 DoS. (2020). *Military-Civil Fusion and the People's Republic of China: Fact Sheet Bureau of International Security and Non-proliferation*. U.S. Department of State

64 Newmyer, J. (2010). The Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics. *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 33(4).

of note that in August 2020, China test fired DF-21 and DF-26 ASBMs, striking moving vessels in an impressive display of previously unconfirmed capabilities.<sup>65</sup>

While the far seas naval capabilities of the PLAN are untested in battle, they have gained valuable experience through their ongoing counter piracy missions and have been used for military diplomacy through port calls and joint training exercises. In addition, they can be expected to continue to develop in order to protect its growing geo-economic interests such as the BRI. The combination of A2/AD capabilities arrayed against China's adversaries in its "near seas" region will certainly pose significant challenges in any future conflict; bringing to mind Admiral Horatio Nelson's adage; "a ship is a fool to fight a fort".

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65 O'Rourke, R. (2021). *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Naval Capabilities - Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service.

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## CLOSING REMARKS

**Dr. Glen Segell**

on behalf of the University of Haifa

Thank you for having invited me to give the Closing Remarks, it was an honor and a pleasure to have listened to today's presentations and to have accompanied the Organizing Committee over the last three months.

When the University of Haifa, Israel approached me in March 2018 to handle the signing of a Framework for Academic Collaboration with the University of the Free State, South Africa, I never imagined in my wildest dreams that a Graduate Student Webinar would happen almost three years later. Not just any Graduate Student Webinar, but one where the organizing committee outperformed even seasoned senior faculty to expedite the event. And the participants did more than justice by presenting their innovative research that followed all the essential academic criteria: introduction, defining the thesis, methodology, content with case and sources, and conclusion with results. And kept to the time!

Over the last three years I managed to travel the 9,621 kilometres to Bloemfontein from Haifa twice to further the academic collaboration between the two universities. The objective was not only in my field and my own research as my academic partnerships were already well established, with faculty at the Free State. Indeed almost 20 years have transpired and we have all changed organizations along the way. The objective was to broaden and deepen the collaboration with the focus on education and not only academia.

Education means students while academia could just be research. Education means many students at all levels. We had many projects in the planning and even at the almost implementation stage but COVID-19 brought these to an abrupt pause. A pause because we shall return to them. In 2019 graduate students from the Speech and Sign Language Department at the Free State presented at a conference at Haifa.

Indeed we were paused at the last second in March 2020 for another event. A delegation of national security experts from Bloemfontein was due to visit Haifa with students from Theology and from the Speech and Sign Language Department at the Free State. They had to cancel their flights at the last minute.

We moved to online events that included a Webinar on Developments in the Middle East on 14 October 2020. The water management team at the Free State and the Arava Institute have similarly made excellent progress in cooperation and collaboration, also using Webinars.

The online webinar event today is testimony that innovative research is what drives both institutions. And that is not only on the faculty level. It is at the student level. I must point here that the content of the presentations of the graduate students today was at the fore of innovative research. New facts were revealed and existing points and notions well criticized, all sustained by primary sourcing.

The online webinar event today proves that graduate students, are not only the future generation of university scholars and faculty in excellent research. They are also more than capable, indeed are excellent in organizing, implementing, and handling an international discussion that transcends their own local culture and home language.

Cooperative/Collaborative Online International Learning (COIL) with the appropriate Learning Objectives is not only to sit in front of computer connected to the Internet but is also an important exercise and a means to cope, no more than that, to strive in a global context and not only when facing a pandemic. Today's event has shown that If the presenters decide to be then they can be the leaders of tomorrow in all aspects of their own society and globally.

Both Professor Solomon from the University of the Free State and myself on behalf of the University of Haifa accompanied the Organizing Committee over the last three months. Yet, to be honest we didn't do much. We received the Minutes of Minutes and concurred that all was on path, and nothing to criticize. To be sure partnership among academic partners is the key to learning from each other and advancing academic excellence. And it takes many forms. This webinar was the first step. Time flies and so next on the list is the "Publication of Colloquium". We have made our suggestions and we have absolute faith that it will exceed our expectations.

A brief note on the content of the last three hours. There has been a diversity of topics from the six speakers. Each respectfully listened to the others even though it wasn't their own field. And indeed I trust they have learned as much as I have. To listen and to question is more than a pedagogy in education, it is a sign of respect and maturity. If only politicians did the same, instead of just speaking, then the world would be different. I learned many new facts about topics that

I don't research and even some innovative methodologies. I will Footnote you when I quote them!

And the next step is the next webinar, and the next group of students. And here today's students can help tomorrows, this is the chain, whereby the next generation of leaders – both Professors and Leaders of Society are born. I have no doubt that today's webinar was a pioneering step that will continue to entrench the academic and educational collaboration between the two institutions in two countries on two different continents.

Education is looking to the future, and with a focus on students at all levels it is an investment for a better world. On that note I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate all today's Graduate Students for demonstrating initiative, scholarship, hard work and looking to the future in your own research projects. That is to say your own future for one day these will be published as articles and books and you will have that Degree you sought.

And so allow me to thank all those at both Universities especially Professor Hussein Solomon, Academic Head of the Department of Political Studies and Governance at the University of the Free State for his tireless enthusiasm in supporting this academic and educational partnership between our respective universities.

Congratulations to all and good luck for the future!!